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Concentration inequalities (CIs) are a powerful tool that provide probability
bounds on how a random variable deviates from its expectation. In this dissertation,
first I describe a blockchain protocol that I have developed, called Graphene, which
uses CIs to provide probabilistic guarantees on performance. Second, I analyze the
extent to which CIs are robust when the assumptions they require are violated, using
Reinforcement Learning (RL) as the domain.
Graphene is a method for interactive set reconciliation among peers in blockchains
and related distributed systems. Through the novel combination of a Bloom filter
and an Invertible Bloom Lookup Table, Graphene uses a fraction of the network
bandwidth used by deployed work for one- and two-way synchronization. It is a
vi
fast and implementation-independent algorithm that uses CIs for parameterizing an
IBLT so that it is optimal in size for a given desired decode rate. I characterize
performance improvements through analysis, detailed simulation, and deployment
results for Bitcoin Cash, a prominent cryptocurrency. Implementations of Graphene,
IBLTs, and the IBLT optimization algorithm are all open-source code.
Second, I analyze the extent to which existing methods rely on accurate training
data for a specific class of RL algorithms, known as Safe and Seldonian RL. Several
Seldonian RL algorithms have a component called the safety test, which uses CIs
to lower bound the performance of a new policy with training data collected from
another policy. I introduce a new measure of security to quantify the susceptibility to
corruptions in training data, and show that a couple of Seldonian RL methods are
extremely sensitive to even a few data corruptions, completely breaking the probability
bounds guaranteed by CIs. I then introduce a new algorithm, called Panacea, that is
more robust against data corruptions, and demonstrate its usage in practice on some
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Randomness is inherent in the world. We owe our unique existence to random
biological processes, mutation and recombination, that result in the genetic composition
of our DNA. However, in our everyday lives, the uncertainty of our future due to the
random nature of our world, especially nowadays escalated by the onset of a worldwide
pandemic, can be daunting, and even frightening. Yet in computer science, we manage
to use randomness as an asset. This dissertation discusses two significant instances
where randomness is valuable to computation.
1.1 Randomness as a Resource
At times, computer scientists study naturally occurring phenomena using probabil-
ity and statistics, which model how randomness works; at other times, they artificially
add randomness to algorithms. In computer networking, the Ethernet protocol lever-
ages randomness by requiring each node in a network to wait a random amount of
time before transferring frames in order to avoid collisions [83]. In cryptography, a
random key and algorithm encode information, enabling a sender and receiver to
privately communicate over the Internet. In operating systems, lottery scheduling
addresses the problem of starvation, by incorporating randomness into an algorithm
used to select processes. In the following section, we discuss the role of randomness
as it pertains to specific problems in blockchain systems [87, 113] and Seldonian
reinforcement learning [108].
1
1.1.1 Randomness for Set Reconciliation in Blockchains
The first half of this dissertation attempts to solve a canonical problem in network-
ing and distributed systems, known as set reconciliation, to achieve synchronization
among replicas, in the context of blockchain systems. Our version of the problem
poses the question of how to relay information, i.e., a set of items, from a sender to a
receiver if the receiver already possesses all or some of the items. First, we create a
protocol assuming that the receiver has all of the items, and then extend it to the
case where the receiver is missing items.
Our proposed solution, instead of sending all the items directly, leverages random-
ness by using probabilistic data structures. These data structures use hash functions
to compactly represent a set of items. Hence, our introduced source of randomness
comes from these hash functions, given the widely held assumption that a good
hash function appears random [83]. The benefit of our non-deterministic protocol is
minimized bandwidth given a low error rate, introduced by the use of probabilistic
data structures.
Minimizing bandwidth while guaranteeing performance is crucial in blockchain
systems for numerous reasons, which are discussed in detail in Section 2.1. To
summarize briefly, the majority of bandwidth in these systems is due to transactions,
similar to those generated by financial institutions. Reduced bandwidth implies
that peers in the system can receive transactions more rapidly, and encourages the
participation of peers with limited-bandwidth links. Furthermore, the system can
scale up if it can support more transactions.
1.1.2 Randomness for Safety in Seldonian RL
The second half of this dissertation analyzes a class of reinforcement learning (RL)
algorithms, referred to as Safe and/or Seldonian RL [108]. This class of algorithms uses
randomly sampled datasets to make predictions, and ensures safety, which guarantees
2
that the algorithm will behave correctly with a user-specified probability. It is a
specific component, called the safety test, that is largely responsible for ensuring safety.
Our analysis of this component answers to what extent the safety guarantee holds
when a subset of the samples is not random.
In real world applications, such non-random samples are caused by anomalies in
training data. For example, RL has been suggested for type 1 diabetes treatment
wherein training data includes measurements taken from a patient’s insulin pump [108].
These devices, often with Internet connection, can run out of battery or malfunction.
Marin et al. [76] showed how a malicious attacker could exploit the security protocols
of a peacemaker to harm a person wearing the device. As more medical devices with
Internet access get approved for distribution, such vulnerabilities will only increase.
Therefore, we must address how to handle discrepancies, which can lead to very
dangerous consequences, in data.
Our formulation of the problem represents anomalies as samples artificially created
by a malicious attacker. The incorporation of an adversary provides a worst-case
analysis to understand the robustness of safety tests to anomalies in data; because any
algorithm robust to an adversary is also robust to non-adversarial anomalies in data.
After quantifying the robustness of existing methods, we introduce a new algorithm,
Panacea, which provides a user-specified level of robustness when the number of
non-random samples in the dataset is upper bounded.
Next, we define a concentration inequality (CI), and provide a brief history. Then
we present some canonical applications of CIs in computer science to exhibit their




Both sections of the dissertation leverage CIs to bound the probability that a
random variable deviates from some value, typically its expectation or median. A
CI is a proven statement that specifies the properties of the random variable, and
also quantifies the following: 1) The specific value around which the values of the
random variable are centered; 2) The deviation or distance around this center; and
3) The probability of observing values within a given distance to the center. Such
statements are also known as tail inequalities or tail bounds. A random variable is
highly concentrated if its values are close to some specific value with high probability.
All CIs require samples to be random, but differ in terms of the additional
information needed in order to use them. Some considerations for picking the right
CI for an application domain include whether random variables are independent and
drawn from a specific distribution, as well as whether it is easy to obtain a sample
mean and variance.
1.2.1 A Brief History
Mathematicians, especially those interested in probability theory, statistical me-
chanics and functional analysis—subareas dealing with an infinite number of variables—
studied and developed ideas surrounding the concentration of a random variable within
the last century [15]. In 1952, the American statistician Herman Chernoff published
a paper, which introduced the canonical form of the Chernoff bound. However, in
his personal essay titled “A career in statistics,” which appeared in the book, “Past,
Present and Future of Statistics,” Chernoff regretfully claimed that he should have
also given credit to his colleague Herman Rubin, a statistician, who earned his Ph.D.
from the University Chicago in 1948 [67]. Alas, it is Rubin’s proof of Chernoff’s upper
bound that is often presented to graduate students today.
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Rubin used Markov’s inequality to obtain Chernoff’s upper bound. In fact,
Markov’s inequality is also a misnomer because it first appeared in the work of Russian
mathematician Pafnuty Chebyshev [50]. Although it is named after Chebyshev’s stu-
dent, Andrey Markov, sometimes it is also referred to as the first Chebyshev inequality
(making the well-known Chebyshev inequality the second Chebyshev inequality). In
his proof, Rubin applied the Markov inequality to the moment generating function—a
set of mathematical functions uniquely characterizing a probability distribution—of a
random variable.
A major development occurred with the birth of a concept called the concentration
of measure, which appeared in a 1971 paper, by mathematician Vitali Milman [63].
French mathematician, Michel Talagrand, expanded on Milman’s work in the 1990’s
and formally defined this concept, which he summarized as follows: “A random variable
that depends (in a ‘smooth’ way) on many independent random variables (but not too
much on any of them) is essentially constant” [15, 103]. Depending on the smoothness
condition, this statement can have multiple meanings [15]. Nonetheless, it often means
that “a random variable X concentrates around” the sample mean “x in a way that
the probability of the event {|X − x| ≥ t}, for a given t > 0, decays exponentially in
t” [97]. In the decades following Talagrand’s work, CIs gained momentum, becoming
a main subject of study and widely used in areas such as statistics, physics and the
social sciences.
1.2.2 Application of Concentration Inequalities
In computer science, CIs are important tools with many applications. The subfield
of randomized algorithms is dedicated to solving difficult problems, by adding a non-
deterministic component into an algorithm, which outputs a random variable. Applying
a CI to the observed samples, obtained over multiple runs of an algorithm, enables
making predictions on the mean or median of that random variable. Additionally, CIs
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provide a method to analyze the runtime of a randomized algorithm, i.e., how many
runs are required such that the observed values predict the mean or median with high
probability.
Another domain for the application of CIs in theoretical computer science is
streaming algorithms. In the streaming model, at a high level, the goal is to compute
some statistic—such as the mean, number of distinct numbers, most occurring number—
from an input sequence of numbers within a given range, coming in one at a time [22].
A CI informs the design of a randomized algorithm that can compute the statistic
with high probability, given space constraints, which are often defined as a function of
the sequence size or the size of the universe of numbers from which the sequence is
generated. Both in the case of streaming and randomized algorithms, CIs offer speed
and simplicity, compared to their deterministic counterpart [86].
In machine learning, the assumption that samples are random is crucial to learn
from data [1]. CIs offer a partial solution to the learning problem, which asks how to
learn an unknown function f from a dataset [1]. Although a CI does not tell us what
f is, it enables us to learn something, such as the mean or median of f , outside of the
data [1].
1.2.2.1 Chernoff Bound for Blockchain Systems
In Chapter 2, we use the well-known Chernoff bound [23] for parameterizing
our probabilistic data structures in order to guarantee our protocol’s performance
with high probability. The parameterization of our data structures ensures minimal
bandwidth given a user-specified performance.
There are many variants of the Chernoff bound, depending on the the distribution
of the random variable, and whether the random variable in question is a sum of
other independent random variables. The version, which we utilize in Chapter 2, is
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concerned with a random variable X that is the sum of n independent Bernoulli trials.
The inequality states the following.
Chernoff Bound. Let X be the sum of n independent Bernoulli trials, X1, . . . , Xn,






For the same set of assumptions and variables, we use the following version of the
bound:








The derivation of Eq. (1.1) starting from the well-known version of the bound is:
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for x > 0 (see Love
[71]), and that ea−b ≤ ea−c when b ≥ c.
1.2.2.2 Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound for Seldonian RL
In Chapter 3, we analyze the affect of non-random samples added to a dataset,
which is provided as input to a safety test that uses the Chernoff-Hoeffding (CH) [47]
bound to guarantee safety. More accurately known as Hoeffding’s inequality, this
bound is named after the Finnish statistician, Wassily Hoeffding, who is regarded
as one of the primary contributors to the subfield of nonparametric statistics [48].
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His inequality is a generalization of the Chernoff bound, which initially considered a
random variable that is the sum of Bernoulli random variables. In his proof written
in 1963, Hoeffding relaxed the problem by bounding a random variable that is the
sum of random variables that can come from any distribution. The inequality states
the following.
Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound. Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent bounded random
variables with Xi ∈ [a, b] for all n, where −∞ < a ≤ b < ∞. Let X = 1/n
∑n
i=1Xi






The version of the CH inequality we use, keeping the same set of definitions and
assumptions, is the following. For any δ ∈ [0, 1],
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Replacing the definition of δ and t into the canonical form, we arrive at Eq. (1.2) .
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Overall, this dissertation provides a use case for the application of CIs, yet all
the while determines their limitations when samples are not completely random—a
likely scenario when anomalies such as errors, missing entries, malicious attacks etc.
interfere with the natural course of events. Notice that randomness is necessary for
the application of CIs, which, in the case of blockchain systems, reduces network
bandwidth. In the case of Safe and Seldonian RL, it is due to the randomness of
training data, that we are able to use CIs, and consequently, guarantee safety even
when a subset of the samples is not random.
1.3 Collaborators
The study presented in Chapter 2 was conducted under the supervision of Professor
Brian Levine. Additional collaborators include George Bissias, Gavin Andresen, Darren
Tapp, Sunny Katkuri, and Amir Houmansadr [89, 90]. Chapter 3 was completed
in collaboration with Philip Thomas [91], and was partly the result of insightful
conversations with members of the Autonomous Learning Laboratory, specifically
Yash Chandak and Stephen Giguere.
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CHAPTER 2
SET RECONCILIATION APPLIED TO BLOCKCHAIN
PROPAGATION
2.1 Introduction
Minimizing the network bandwidth required for synchronization among replicas
of widely propagated information is a classic need of many distributed systems.
Blockchains [87, 113] and protocols for distributed consensus [26, 56] are the most
recent examples of systems where the performance of network-based synchronization
is a critical factor in overall performance. Whether based on proof-of-work [55, 87],
proof-of-stake [18, 39], or a directed acyclic graph (DAG) [65], the ability for these
systems to scale to a large user base rely on assumptions about synchronization.
In all these systems, if the network protocol used for synchronization of newly
authored transactions and newly mined blocks of validated transactions among peers is
efficient, there are numerous benefits. First, if blocks can be relayed using less network
data, then the maximum block size can be increased, which means an increase in the
overall number of transactions per second. Scaling the transaction rate of Bitcoin is
a critical performance issue [25, 27] driving many fundamental design choices such
as inter-block time [113], block size, and layering [31]. Second, throughput is a
bottleneck for propagating blocks larger than 20KB, and delays grow linearly with
block size [25, 27]. As a consequence of the FLP result [35], blockchains cannot
guarantee consensus. Smaller encodings of blocks allow for miners to reach consensus
more rapidly, avoiding conflicts called forks. Moreover, systems based on GHOST [101],
such as Ethereum [113], record forks on the chain forever, resulting in storage bloat.
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Finally, using less bandwidth to relay a block allows greater participation by peers
who are behind limited-bandwidth links or routes (e.g., China’s firewall).
Contributions. In this chapter, we introduce Graphene, a probabilistic method
and protocol for synchronizing blocks (and mempools) with high probability among
peers in blockchains and related systems. Graphene uses a fraction of the network
bandwidth of related work; for example, for larger blocks, our protocol uses 12% of
the bandwidth of existing deployed systems. To do so, we make novel contributions
to network-based set reconciliation methods and the application of probabilistic data
structures to network protocols. We characterize our performance through analysis,
detailed simulation, and open-source deployments. Our contributions include the
following.
• We design a new protocol that solves the problem of determining which elements
in a set M stored by a receiver are members of a subset N ⊆ M chosen by a
sender. We apply the solution to relaying a block of n = |N | transactions to a
receiver holding m = |M | transactions. We use a novel combination of a Bloom
filter [12] and an Invertible Bloom Lookup Table (IBLT) [44]. Our approach
is smaller than using current deployed solutions [24] and previous IBLT-based
approximate solutions [33]. We show our solution to this specific problem is an
improvement of Ω(n log n) over using an optimal Bloom filter alone.
• We extend our solution to the more general case where some of the elements
of N are not stored by the receiver. Thus, our protocol extension handles
the case where a receiver is missing transactions in the sender’s block; our
solution is a small fraction of the size of previous work [111] at the cost of an
additional message. Additionally, we show how Graphene can efficiently identify
transactions held by the receiver but not the sender.
11
• We design and evaluate an efficient search algorithm for parameterizing an
IBLT so that it is optimally small in size but meets a desired decode rate with
arbitrarily high probability. Because it is based on a hypergraph representation,
it has faster execution times. This result is applicable beyond our context to
any use of IBLTs.
• We design and evaluate a method for significantly improving the decode rate of
an IBLT when two IBLTs are available that are based on roughly the same set
of elements. This method is also a generally applicable.
• We provide a detailed evaluation using theoretical analysis and simulation to
quantify performance against existing systems. We also characterize perfor-
mance of our protocol in a live Bitcoin Cash deployment, and in an Ethereum
implementation for historic blocks. We also show that Graphene is more resilient
to attack than previous approaches.
We have publicly released our Bitcoin Cash and Ethereum implementations of
Graphene [7, 53], a C++ and Python implementation of IBLTs including code for
finding their optimal parameters [64], and we have released a public network specifica-
tion of our basic protocol for standard interoperability [9]. It has been adopted by
blockchain developers in released clients, replacing past approaches [10, 11]. While
our focus is on blockchains, our work applies in general to systems that require set
reconciliation, such as database or file system synchronization among replicas. Or
for example systems such as CRLite [61], where a client regularly checks a server for
revocations of observed certificates.
2.2 Background and Related Work
Below, we summarize and contrast related work in network-based set reconciliation
and protocols for block propagation.
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2.2.1 Set Reconciliation Data Structures
Set reconciliation protocols allow two peers, each holding a set, to obtain and
transmit the union of the two sets. This synchronization goal is distinct from set
membership protocols [21], which tell us, more simply, if an element is a member of a
set. However, data structures that test set membership are useful for set reconciliation.
This includes Bloom filters [12], a seminal probabilistic data structure with myriad
applications [16, 72, 104]. Bloom filters encode membership for a set of size n
by inserting the items into a small array of −n log2(f)
ln(2)
bits. Each item is inserted
k = log(2)m/n times using independent hash functions. This efficiency gain comes at
the expense of allowing a false positive rate (FPR), f .
Invertible Bloom Lookup Tables (IBLTs) [44] are a richer probabilistic data struc-
ture designed to recover the symmetric difference of two sets of items. Like Bloom
filters, items are inserted into an IBLT’s array of c cells, which is partitioned into
subsets of size c/k. Each item is inserted once into each of the k partitions, at indices
selected by k hash functions. Rather than storing only a bit, the cells store aggregates
of the actual items. Each cell has a count of the number of items inserted and the
xor of all items inserted (called a keySum). The following algorithm [33] recovers the
symmetric difference of two sets. Each set is stored in an IBLT, A and B, respectively,
(with equal c and k values). For each pairwise cell of A and B, the keySums are
xor’ed and the counts subtracted, resulting in a third IBLT: A4 B = C that lacks
items in the intersection. The cells in C with count = 1 hold an item belonging to
only A, and to only B if count = −1. These items are removed from the k − 1 other
cells, which decrements their counts and allows for the additional peeling of new items.
This process continues until all cells have a count of 0. (A checkSum field catches a
special case: if x values in a cell from A and x− 1 values that are not a subset from
the corresponding cell in B are subtracted, then count= 1 but the value contained
is part of neither set.) If c is too small given the actual symmetric difference, then
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iterative peeling will eventually fail, resulting in a decode failure, and only part of the
symmetric difference will be recovered.
There are many variations of Bloom filters that present different trade-offs, such
as more computation for smaller size. Similarly, IBLTs are one of several alternatives.
For example, several approaches involve more computation but are smaller in size [30,
80, 114] (see [33] for a comparison). We have not investigated how alternatives to
IBLTs improve Graphene’s size nor how, for example, computational costs differ.
Our focus is on IBLTs because they are balanced: minimal computational costs and
small size. While miners may have strong computational resources, full nodes and
lighter clients in blockchains may not. More importantly, as our deployment results in
Section 2.5.3 show, Graphene’s size grows slowly as block size increases for the most
likely scenarios in Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Ethereum, demonstrating that IBLTs
are a good fit for our problem. Finally, some of these solutions are complementary; for
example, minsketch [114] can be used within the cells of IBLTs to reduce Graphene’s
size further.
Comparison to related work. We provide a novel solution to the problem of set
reconciliation, where one-way or mutual synchronization of information is required by
two peers. Our results are significantly better than deployed past work that is based
on Bloom filters alone [111] or IBLTs alone [33, 44], as we show in Section 2.5.3.
Byers et al. [19] introduce a new data structure called Approximate Reconciliation
Trees (ARTs), based on Merkle trees, for set reconciliation. Their focus is different
than ours, as their goal is not to discover the exact symmetric difference between two
sets held by sender and receiver. Eppstein et al. [33] also present a set reconciliation
solution, based primarily on IBLTs. They show their approach is more efficient for
symmetric differences of 10k or fewer than ARTs as well as Characteristic Polynomial
Interpolation [80], which is another solution to set reconciliation. Our method is more
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efficient than these past approaches for discovering the exact symmetric difference in
terms of storage or computation or both.
We provide several contributions to IBLTs. In general, if one desires to decode
sets of size j from an IBLT, a set of values τ > 0 and k > 2 must be found that result
in c = jτ cells (divisible by k) such that the probability of decoding is at least p. We
provide an implementation-independent algorithm for finding values τ and k that
meet rate p and result in the smallest value of c.
Our work advances the usability of IBLTs. Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [44]
provide values of τ that asymptotically ensure a failure rate that decreases polynomially
with j. But these asymptotic results are not optimally small in size for finite j and
do not help us set the value of k optimally. Using their unreleased implementation,
Eppstein et al. [33] identify optimal τ and k that meet a desired decode rate for a
selection of j values; however, the statistical certainty of this optimality is unclear.
In comparison, using our open-source IBLT implementation [64], we are able to
systematically produce statistically optimal values for τ and k (within a finite search
range) for a wide range of j values. Because our method is based on hypergraphs, it
is an order of magnitude faster than this previous method [33].
We also contribute a novel method for improving the decode rate of IBLTs that is
similar in approach to Gollakota and Katabi [40]. Our method is complementary to
related work by Pontarelli et al. [95], who have the same goal.
2.2.2 Block Propagation
Blockchains, distributed ledgers, and related technologies require a network protocol
for distributing new transactions and new blocks. Almost all make use of a p2p network,
often a clique among miners that validate blocks, and a random topology among
non-mining full nodes that store the entire chain. New transactions have an ID equal
to their cryptographic hash. When a new transaction is received, a peer sends the
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ID as the contents of an inventory (inv) message to all d neighbors, who request
a getdata message if the transaction is new to them. Transactions are stored in a
mempool until included in a valid block. Blocks are relayed similarly: an inv is sent to
each neighbor (often the header is sent instead to save time), and a getdata requests
the block if needed. The root of a Merkle tree [78] of all transactions validates an
ordered set against the mined block.
The block consists of a header and a set of transactions. These transactions can
be relayed by the sender in full, but this wastes bandwidth because they are probably
already stored by the receiver. In other words, blocks can be relayed with a compressed
encoding, and a number of schemes have been proposed. As stated in Section 2.1,
efficient propagation of blocks is critical to achieving consensus, reducing storage bloat,
overcoming network firewall bottlenecks, and allowing scaling to a large number of
transactions per second.
Transactions that offer low fees to miners are sometimes marked as DoS spam and
not propagated by full nodes; yet, they are sometimes included in blocks, regardless.
To avoid sending redundant inv messages, peers keep track, on a per-transaction and
per-neighbor basis, whether an inv has been exchanged. This log can be used by
protocols to send missing transactions to a receiver proactively as the block is relayed.
Comparison to related work. Xtreme Thinblocks [111] (XThin) is a robust and
efficient protocol for relaying blocks, and is deployed in Bitcoin Unlimited (BU) clients.
The receiver’s getdata message includes a Bloom filter encoding the transaction IDs in
her mempool. The sender responds with a list of the block’s transaction IDs shortened
to 8-bytes (since the risk of collision is still low), and uses the Bloom filter to also
send any transactions that the receiver is missing. XThin’s bandwidth increases with
the size of the receiver’s mempool, which is likely a multiple of the block size. In
comparison, Graphene uses significantly lower bandwidth both when the receiver is
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and is not missing transactions. However, Graphene may use an additional roundtrip
time to repair missing transactions.
Compact Blocks [24] is a protocol that is deployed in the Bitcoin Core, Bitcoin
ABC, and Bitcoin Unlimited clients. In this protocol, the receiver’s getdata message
is a simple request (no Bloom filter is sent). The sender replies with the block’s
transaction IDs shorted to 6-bytes (as well as the coinbase transaction). If the receiver
has missing transactions, she requests repairs with a followup inv message. Hence,
the network cost is 6n bytes, which is smaller than XThin’s cost of a Bloom filter
and a list of transaction IDs, which is approximately m log2(f)
8ln(2)
+ 6n; however, when the
receiver is missing transactions, Compact Blocks has an extra roundtrip time, which
may cost more if enough transactions are missing. Graphene is significantly lower in
cost than Compact Blocks, as we show in Section 2.5.3.
Recently, Xthinner [110] was proposed as a variant of Xthin that employs com-
pression techniques on the list of transactions in a block. Since the author states that
Xthinner is not as compact as Graphene, we do not compare against it [109].
2.3 The Graphene Protocol
The primary goal of Graphene is to reduce the amount of network traffic resulting
from synchronization of a sender and receiver; we do so in the context of block
propagation. To motivate Graphene, consider a protocol that uses a Bloom filter alone
to encode a block containing n transactions. Assume the receiver has a mempool of
m transactions that are a super set of the sender’s block. If we set the FPR of the
sender’s Bloom filter to f = 1
144(m−n) , then we can expect the filter to falsely include
an extra transaction in a relayed block about once every 144 blocks (approximately
once a day in Bitcoin). This approach requires −n log2(f)
8 ln(2)
bytes, and it is easy to show

















Figure 2.1: (Left) The receiver’s mempool contains the entire block; Protocol 1:
Graphene manages this scenario. (Right) The receiver’s mempool does not contain
the entire block. Protocol 2: Graphene Extended manages this scenario.
But we can do better than using a Bloom filter alone: in Graphene, we shrink
the size of the sender’s Bloom filter by increasing its FPR, and we correct any false
positives at the receiver with an IBLT. The summed size of the two structures is
smaller than using either alone. In practice, our technique performs significantly
better than Compact Blocks for all but the smallest number of transactions, and we
show in Section 2.5.3 that it performs better than any Bloom-filter-only approach
asymptotically.
We design two protocols for Graphene, which we define presently. Both protocols
use probabilistic data structures that fail with a tunable probability. Throughout our
exposition, we use the concept of probabilistic assurance. Specifically, a property A is
said to be held in data structure X with β-assurance whenever it is possible to tune
X so that A occurs in X with probability at least β.
In Protocol 1, we assume that the receiver’s mempool contains all transactions in
the block, a typical case due to the aggressive synchronization that blockchains employ.
So, our first design choice is to optimize for this scenario illustrated in Fig. 2.1-Left.
As we show in Section 2.5.3, Protocol 1 is usually enough to propagate blocks.
In Protocol 2, we do not assume that the receiver’s mempool is synchronized, as
illustrated in Fig. 2.1-Right, which allows us to apply it to two scenarios: (i) block








I = IBLT(insert=block, symdiff=a*)
4. Z=mempool txns in S
    I’=IBLT(insert=Z, symdiff=a*)
   block= Z corrected with IΔI’
S = BF(insert=block, fpr=         )
 3. S, I, a*
Receiver
Figure 2.2: An illustration of Protocol 1 for propagating a block that is a subset of
the mempool.
A receiver may not be synchronized with the sender because of network failures, slow
transaction propagation times relative to blocks, or if the block contains unpropagated
low-fee transactions erroneously filtered out as spam. Protocol 2 begins when Protocol
1 fails: the receiver requests missing transactions using a second Bloom filter; and
the sender transmits any missing transactions, along with a second IBLT to correct
mistakes. (Compact Blocks and XThin also handle this scenario but do so with greater
network bandwidth.)
2.3.1 Protocols
Our first protocol is for receivers whose mempool contains all the transactions in
the block; see Fig. 2.1-Left. The protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
PROTOCOL 1: Graphene
1: Sender: The sender transmits an inv (or blockheader) for a block.
2: Receiver: The receiver requests the unknown block, including a count of transac-
tions in her mempool, m.
3: Sender: The sender creates Bloom filter S and IBLT I from the transaction IDs
of the block (purple area in Fig. 2.1-Left). The FPR of S is fS =
a
m−n , and the
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Protocol 2
2. R, b, y*
J = IBLT(insert=block, symdiff=b+y*)
T = block txns not in R
5. J’=IBLT(insert=Z+T, symdiff=b+y*)
block= Z+T corrected with JΔJ’
  3 and 4. T, J
R = BF(insert=Z, fpr=          )





Figure 2.3: If Protocol 1 fails (e.g., if the block is not a subset of the mempool),
Protocol 2 recovers with one roundtrip.
IBLT is parameterized such that a∗ items can be recovered, where a∗ > a with
β-assurance (outlined in green in Fig. 2.4). We set a so as to minimize the total
size of S and I. S and I are sent to the receiver along with the block header (if
not sent in Step 1).
4: Receiver: The receiver creates a candidate set Z of transaction IDs that pass
through S, including false positives (purple and dark blue areas in Fig. 2.4).
The receiver also creates IBLT I′ from Z. She subtracts I 4 I′, which evaluates
to the symmetric difference of the two sets [33]. Based on the result, she adjusts
the candidate set, validates the Merkle root in the block header, and decodes the
block.
In blockchains, the sender knows the transactions for which no inv message has been
exchanged with the receiver1; those transactions could be sent at Step 3 in order to
reduce the number of transactions in I 4 I′. (N.b., the IBLT stores only 8 bytes of
each transaction ID; but full IDs are used for the Bloom filter.)
1In theory peers know this information; but in practice they use lossy data structures to keep











m − n not
in block
a∗>a
Figure 2.4: [Protocol 1] Passing m mem-
pool transactions through S results in a
FPs (in dark blue). A green outline illus-
















Figure 2.5: [Protocol 2] Passing m trans-
actions through S results in z positives,
obscuring a count of x TPs (purple) and
y FPs (in dark blue). From z, we derive













Figure 2.6: [Protocol 2] From our bound m−x∗ > m−x with β-assurance (in yellow),
we can derive a bound for the false positives from S as y∗ > y with β-assurance
outlined in green.
We use a fast algorithm to select a such that the total amount of data transmitted
over the network is optimally small; see Section 2.3.3.1. The count of false positives
from S has an expected mean of (m−n)fS = a, whose variance comes from a Binomial
distribution with parameters (m− n) and fS. Because of this variance, a∗ should be
used to parameterize I instead of a. We derive a∗ in Section 2.3.3.1 via a Chernoff
bound.
2.3.2 Graphene Extended
If the receiver does not have all the transactions in the block (Fig.2.1-Right), IBLT
subtraction in Protocol 1 will not succeed. In that case, the receiver should continue
with the following protocol, illustrated in Fig. 2.3. Subsequently, we show how this
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protocol can also be used for intermittent mempool synchronization. Our contribution
is not only the design of this efficient protocol, but the derivation of parameters that
meet a desired decode rate.
PROTOCOL 2: Graphene Extended
1: Receiver: The size of the candidate set is |Z| = z, where z = x+y, a sum of x true
positives and y false positives (purple and dark blue areas in Fig. 2.5). Because
the values of x and y are obfuscated within the sum, the receiver calculates x∗
such that x∗ ≤ x with β-assurance (green outline in Fig. 2.5) She also calculates
y∗ such that y∗ ≥ y with β-assurance (green outline in Fig. 2.6).
2: Receiver: The receiver creates Bloom filter R and adds all transaction IDs in Z
to R. The FPR of the filter is fR =
b
n−x∗ , where b minimizes the size of R and
IBLT J in step 4. She sends R, y∗ and b.
3: Sender: The sender passes all transaction IDs in the block through R. She sends
all transactions that are not in R directly to the receiver (red area of Fig. 2.6)
4: Sender: The sender creates and sends an IBLT J of all transactions in the block
such that b + y∗ items can be recovered from it. This size accounts for b, the
number of transactions that falsely appear to be in R, and y∗, the number of
transactions that falsely appear to be in S.
5: Receiver: The receiver creates IBLT J′ from the transaction IDs in Z and the
new transaction IDs sent by the sender in step 3. She decodes the subtraction of
the two blocks, J4 J′. From the result, she adjusts set Z, validates the Merkle
root, and decodes the block.
As in Protocol 1, we set b so that the summed size of R and J is optimally small; see
Section 2.3.3.1. We also derive solutions for x∗ and y∗; see Section 2.3.3.2.
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2.3.2.1 Mempool Synchronization
With a few changes, Protocols 1 and 2 can be used by two peers to synchronize
their mempools so that both parties obtain the union of the two mempools, instead of
a block that is a subset of one of the mempools. In this context, instead of a block,
the sender places his entire mempool in S and I. The receiver passes her mempool
through S, adding any negatives to H, the set of transactions that are not in S. Some
transactions that the sender does not have in his mempool will falsely pass through
S, and these are identified by I (assuming that it decodes); these transactions are
also added to H. If I does not decode, Protocol 2 is executed to find transactions
in the symmetric difference of the mempools; all missing transactions among the
sender and receiver are exchanged, including those in set H. The protocol is more
efficient if the peer with the smaller mempool acts as the sender since S will be smaller.
Section 2.5.3.2 shows that the protocol is efficient.
2.3.3 Ensuring Probabilistic Data Structure Success
Cryptocurrencies allow no room for error: the header’s Merkle root can be validated
with an exact set of transactions only. Yet, Graphene is a probabilistic solution, and
if its failure rate is high, resources are wasted on recovery. In this section, we derive
the parameters for Graphene that ensure a tunable, high success rate.
2.3.3.1 Parameterizing Bloom filter S and IBLT I
Graphene sends the least amount of data over the network when the sum of the
Bloom filter S and IBLT I is minimal. Let T = TBF + TI be the summed size of the
Bloom filter and IBLT. The size of a Bloom filter in bytes, TBF , with false positive
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rate fS and n items inserted is TBF =
−n ln(fS)
8 ln2 2
[12]. Recall that we recover up to a∗
items from the IBLT, where a∗ > a with β-assurance. As we show in Section 2.3.3.1,
a∗ = (1 + δ)a, where δ is parameterized by β. An IBLT’s size is a product of the
number of items recoverable from a symmetric difference and a multiplier τ that
ensures recovery at a desired success rate. Therefore, given the cost of r bytes per
cell, TI is
TI = rτ(1 + δ)a.
When we set fS =
a





+ rτ(1 + δ)a. (2.1)
The value of a that minimizes T is either: a = 1; a = m− n; or the value of a where
the derivative of Eq. (2.1) with respect to a is equal to zero. When δ = 0 this is equal
to
a = n/(8rτ ln2 2). (2.2)
Eq. (2.2) is a good approximation for the minimum when δ is close to 0; and the
exact value is difficult to derive. Furthermore, implementations of Bloom filters and
IBLTs involve non-continuous ceiling functions. As a result, Eq. (2.2) is accurate only
for a ≥ 100; otherwise the critical point a′ produced by Eq. (2.2) can be inaccurate
enough that T (a′) is as much as 20% higher than its true minimum value. Graphene
exceeds the performance of previous work when Eq. (2.2) is used to select a. However,
implementations that desire strictly optimal performance should take an extra step.
If Eq. (2.2) results in a value of a less than 100, its size should be computed using
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accurate ceiling functions and compared against all points a < 100. This is a typical
case in our implementation for current block sizes.
Derivation of a∗. We can parameterize IBLT I based on the expected number of false
positives from S, but to ensure a high decode rate, we must account for the natural
variance of false positives generated by S. Here we derive a closed-form expression for
a∗ as a function of a and β such that a∗ > a holds with β-assurance, i.e. a∗ > a with
probability at least β. Define A1, . . . , Am−n to be independent Bernoulli trials such
that Pr[Ai = 1] = fS, A =
∑m−n
i=1 Ai, and µ = E[A].
Theorem 1. Let m be the size of a mempool that contains all n transactions from
a block. If a is the number of false positives that result from passing the mempool
through Bloom filter S with FPR fS, then a
∗ ≥ a with probability β when










Proof. There are m − n potential false positives that pass through S. They are a
set A1, . . . , Am−n of independent Bernoulli trials such that Pr[Ai = 1] = fS. Let
A =
∑m−n
i=1 Ai and µ = E[A] = fS(m − n) =
a
m−n(m − n) = a. From Lemma 1, we
have








for δ ≥ 0. The receiver can set a bound of choice, 0 < β < 1, and solve for δ using the
right hand side of the above equation. To bound with high probability, we seek the
complement of the right hand side
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According to Theorem 1, if the sender sends a Bloom filter with FPR fS =
a
m−n ,
then with β-assurance, no more than a∗ false positives will be generated by passing
elements from Z though S. To compensate for the variance in false positives, IBLT
I is parameterized by a symmetric difference of a∗ = (1 + δ)a items. I will decode
subject to its own error rate (see Section 2.4), provided that a < a∗ (which occurs
with probability β) and the receiver has all n transactions in the block. We evaluate
this approach in Section 2.5.3; see Fig. 2.16.
2.3.3.2 Parameterizing Bloom filter R and IBLT J
Parameterizing b. In Protocol 2, we select b so that the summed size of R and J
is optimally small. Its derivation is similar to a. We show below that y∗ = (1 + δ)y.





+ rτ(1 + δ)b. (2.4)
When δ = 0, the optimal value of b assuming continuous values is
b = z/(8rτ ln2 2). (2.5)
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Similar to Section 2.3.3.1, an exact closed form for b is difficult to derive; and a
perfectly optimal implementation would compute T (b) using ceiling functions for
values of b < 100.
Using z to parameterize R and J. Here we offer a closed-form solution to the
problem of parameterizing Bloom filter R and IBLT J. This is a more challenging
problem because x and y cannot be observed directly.
Let z be the observed count of transactions that pass through Bloom filter S. We
know that z = x+ y: the sum of x true positives and y false positives, illustrated as
purple and dark blue areas respectively in Fig. 2.5. Even though x is unobservable,
we can calculate a lower bound x∗, depending on x, z, m, fS and β, such that x
∗ ≤ x
with β-assurance, illustrated as a green outline in Fig. 2.5.
With x∗ in hand, we also have, with β-assurance, an upper bound on the number
of transactions the receiver is missing: n− x∗ > n− x. This bound allows us to
conservatively set fR =
b
n−x∗ for Bloom filter R. In other words, since x
∗ < x with
β-assurance, the sender, using R, will fail to send no more than b of the n − x
transactions actually missing at the receiver. IBLT J repairs these b failures, subject
to its own error rate (see Section 2.4).
We also use x∗ to calculate, with β-assurance, an upper bound y∗ ≥ y on the
number of false positives that pass through S. The green area in Fig. 2.6 shows y∗,
which is a superset of the actual value for y, the dark blue area.
The sender’s IBLT J contains all transactions in the block. The receiver’s IBLT J′
contains true positives from S, false positives from S, and newly sent transactions.
Therefore, we bound both components of the symmetric difference by b+y∗ transactions
in order for the subtraction operation to decode. In other words, both J and J′ are
parameterized to account for more items than actually exist in the symmetric difference
between the two IBLTs. Note that we use β-assurance to bound the performance of
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each probabilistic data structure; in doing so, we establish worst-case performance
guarantees for our protocol.
The following theorems derive values for x∗ and y∗.
Theorem 2. Let m be the size of a mempool containing 0 ≤ x ≤ n transactions from
a block. Let z = x+ y be the count of mempool transactions that pass through S with
FPR fS, with true positive count x and false positive count y. Then x
∗ ≤ x with
probability β when
x∗ = arg min
x∗
Pr[x ≤x∗; z,m, fS] ≤ 1− β.











Proof. Let Y1, . . . , Ym−x be independent Bernoulli trials representing transactions not




For a given value x, we can compute Pr[Y ≥ y], the probability of at least y false
positives passing through the sender’s Bloom filter. We apply a Chernoff bound [23]:






where δ > 0, and µ = E[Y ] = (m− x)fS. By setting (1 + δ)µ = z − x and solving for
δ, we have





We substitute δ into Eq. (2.6) and bound the probability of observing a value of
y = z − x or greater, given that the receiver has x transactions in the block. This
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realization allows us to enumerate all possible scenarios for observation z. The
cumulative probability of observing y, parametrized by z, given that the receiver has
at most k of the transactions in the block, is:














− 1. Finally, using this closed-form equation, we select a bounding
probability β, such as β = 239/240. We seek a probability β of observing z from a
value x∗ or larger; equivalently, we solve for the complement:
arg min
x∗
Pr[x ≤ x∗; z,m, fS] ≤ 1− β.
To summarize, x∗ is the smallest number of true positives such that the cumulative
probability of observing y = z − x∗ false positives is at least 1− β.
For good measure, we validated the theorem empirically, as shown in Fig. 2.7.
Theorem 3. Let m be the size of a mempool containing 0 ≤ x ≤ n transactions from
a block. Let z = x+ y be the count of mempool transactions that pass through S with
FPR fS, with true positive count x and false positive count y. Then y
∗ ≥ y with
probability β when
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Figure 2.7: [Simulation, Protocol 2] The fraction of Monte Carlo experiments where
x∗ < x via Theorem 2 compared to a desired bound of β = 239/240 (shown as a red
dotted line).
Proof. First, we solve for x∗ ≤ x with β-assurance using Theorem 2. We find
y∗ = z−x∗ ≥ y by applying Lemma 1 to Y =
∑m−x∗
i=1 , the sum of m−x∗ independent
Bernoulli trials such that Pr[Yi = 1] = fS trials and µ = (m− x∗)fS:








for δ ≥ 0. We select 0 < β < 1, and solve for δ using the right hand side of Eq. (2.7).
To bound with high probability, we seek the complement of the right hand side.


















y∗ = (1 + δ)(m− x∗)fS.
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Figure 2.8: [Simulation, Protocol 2] The fraction of Monte Carlo experiments where
y∗ > y via Theorem 3 compared to a desired bound of β = 239/240 (shown as a red
dotted line).
Since, x∗ ≤ x with β-assurance, it follows that y∗ also bounds the sum of m − x
Bernoulli trials, where
y∗ = (1 + δ)(m− x)fS,
with probability at least β for any δ ≥ 0 and m > 0.
We validated this theorem empirically as well, as shown in Fig. 2.8.
Special case: m ≈ n.When m ≈ n, our optimization procedure in Protocol 1 will
parameterize fS to a value near 1, which is very efficient if the receiver has all of the
block. But if m ≈ n and the receiver is missing some portion of the block, Protocol 1
will fail. Subsequently, with z ≈ m, Protocol 2 will set y∗ ≈ m and x∗ ≈ 0, and
fR ≈ 1; and most importantly, IBLT J will be sized to m, making it larger than a
regular block.
31
Fortunately, resolution is straightforward. If Protocol 1 fails, and the receiver finds
that z ≈ m, y∗ ≈ m, and fR ≈ 1, then in Step 2 of Protocol 2, the receiver should
set fR to a value less than 1. We set fR = 0.1, but a large range of values execute
efficiently (we tested from 0.001 to 0.2). All mempool transactions that pass through
S are inserted into Bloom filter R, and R is transmitted to the sender.
The sender follows the protocol as usual, sending IBLT J along with h transactions
from the mempool not in R. However, he then deviates from the protocol by also
sending a third Bloom filter F intended to compensate for false positives from R. The
n−h transactions that pass through R are inserted into F. The roles of Protocol 2 are
thus reversed: the sender uses Theorems 2 and 3 to solve for x∗ and y∗, respectively,
to bound false positives from R (substituting the block size for mempool size and
fR as the FPR). He then solves for b such that the total size in bytes is minimized
for F with FPR fF =
b
m−x∗ and J having size b + y
∗. This case may be common
when Graphene is used for mempool synchronization; our evaluations in Fig. 2.19 in
Section 2.5.3.2 show that this method is more efficient than Compact Blocks.
Alternatives to Bloom filters. There are dozens of variations of Bloom filters [72,
104], including Cuckoo Filters [34] and Golomb Code sets [41]. Any alternative can
be used if Eqs. (2.1), (2.2), (2.4), and (2.5) are updated appropriately.
2.4 Enhancing IBLT Performance
The success and performance of Graphene rests heavily on IBLT performance.
Using IBLTs over a network has been studied in only a handful of papers [13, 33,
44, 81, 95], and current results are generally asymptotic with the size of the IBLT
(the notable exception is Eppstein et al. [33], which we discuss in Section 2.2). In
this section, we contribute several important results that allow for IBLTs to be used
in practical systems with reliable precision. IBLTs are deceptively challenging to


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.9: Parameterizing an IBLT statically results in poor decode rates. The black
points show the decode failure rate for IBLTs when k = 4 and τ = 1.5. The blue,
green and yellow points show decode failure rates of optimal IBLTs, which always
meet a desired failure rate on each facet (in magenta). Size shown in Fig. 2.11.
p, using the minimal number of cells. Only two parameters can be set: the hedge
factor, τ (resulting in c = jτ cells total), and the number of hash functions, k, used to
determine where to insert an item (each function covers c/k cells).
Motivation. Fig. 2.9 motivates our contributions, showing the poor decode rate of an
IBLT if static values for k and τ are applied to small values of j. The figure shows three
desired decode failure rates (1− p) in magenta: 1/24, 1/240, and 1/2400. The black
points show the decode failure probability we observed in our IBLT implementation for
static settings of τ = 1.5 and k = 4. The resulting decode rate is either too small from
an under-allocated IBLT, or exceeds the rate through over-allocation. The colored
points show the failure rates of actual IBLTs parameterized by the algorithm we define
below: they are optimally small and always meet or exceed the desired decode rate.
2.4.1 Optimal Size and Desired Decode Rate
Past work has never defined an algorithm for determining size-optimal IBLT





























– j items and hyper-edges
– c cells and vertices 
– k hash functions and vertices




















Figure 2.10: An example IBLT (without the checksum field) and its equivalent
hypergraph representation. In the IBLT, k = 3, there are c = 3k cells, and j = 5
items are placed in k cells. In the hypergraph, j hyperedges each have k vertices out
of c vertices total.
interpretation of Molloy [84] and Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [44] as uniform
hypergraphs.
Let H = (V,X, k) be a k-partite, k-uniform hypergraph, composed of a set of c
vertices. Let V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vk, where each Vi is a subset of c/k vertices (we enforce
that c is divisible by k). X is a set of j hyper-edges, each connecting k vertices, one
from each of the Vi. The hypergraph represents an IBLT with k hash functions, j
inserted items, and c cells. As illustrated in Figure 2.10, each cell corresponds to a
vertex, and we have |V | = c and |Vi| = c/k. Each item represents an edge connecting
k vertices, with the ith vertex being chosen uniformly at random from Vi. Vertices in
Vi correspond to hash function i, which operates over a distinct range of cells.
Decoding corresponds to removing edges that contain a vertex of degree 1, re-
peatedly. The r-core [99] of H is the maximal subgraph (after decoding) in which
all vertices have degree at least r. H contains a non-empty 2-core iff the IBLT it
represents cannot be decoded. In the example illustrated in Figure 2.10, edges j3, j4
and j5 contain degree 1 vertices v9, v6, and v3 respectively and can be removed; the
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remaining subgraph comprised of j1 and j2 and degree 2 vertices v1, v4, and v7 is a
2-core. Equivalent operations on the IBLT would show that items j1 and j2 cannot
be decoded.
Algorithm 1: IBLT-Param-Search(j, k, p)
1: cl = 1
2: ch = cmax
3: trials = 0
4: success = 0
5: L = (1− p)/5
6: while cl 6= ch do
7: trials += 1
8: c = (cl + ch)/2
9: if decode(j, k, c) then
10: success += 1
11: end if
12: conf=conf int(success, trials)
13: r = success/trials
14: if r − conf ≥ p then
15: ch = c
16: end if
17: if (r + conf ≤ p) then
18: cl = c
19: end if
20: if (r − conf > p− L) and (r + conf < p+ L) then




Algorithm 1. This algorithm searches for the optimally small size of c = jτ cells
that decodes j items with decode success probability p (within appropriate confidence
intervals) from an IBLT with k hash functions. decode() operates over a hypergraph
rather than a real IBLT.
We seek an algorithm for determining the most space-efficient choice for c and k
that is sufficient to ensure a decode rate of p for a fixed number of inserted items
j. Items are inserted pseudo-randomly by applying the hash functions. There-
fore, it makes sense to model the edge set X as a random variable. Define Hj,p =
{(V,X, k) | E[decode((V,X, k))] ≥ p, |X| = j}, or the set of hypergraphs (V,X, k) on
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j edges whose expected decode success rate is bounded by p. Based on this definition,




Our approach for solving Eq. (2.9) is to fix j, p, and k and perform binary search
over all possible values for c = |V |. A key point is that binary search is justified by
the fact that the expected decode failure rate is a monotonically increasing function of
c. This notion can explained as follows. A 2-core forms in (V,X, k) when there exists
some group of v vertices that exclusively share a set of at least 2v edges. Define vertex
set U such that |U | > |V |. Since the j edges in X are chosen uniformly at random,
and there are more possible edges on vertex set U , the probability that a given set of
2v edges forms in (U,X, k) must be lower than in (V,X, k).
Fig. 1 shows the pseudocode for our algorithm, which relies on two functions. The
function decode(j,k,c) takes a random sample from the set of hypergraphs Hj,p
and determines if it forms a 2-core (i.e., if it decodes), returning True or False. The
function conf int(s,t) returns the two-sided confidence interval of a proportion of s
successes and t trials. We set cmax = 20 in our implementation; in general, that value
could be made part of the search itself [6]. In practice, we call Alg. 1 from an outer
loop of values of k that we have observed to be reasonable (e.g., 3 to 12), and prune
the search of each k when it is clear that it will not be smaller in size than a known
result. To be clear, the algorithm is optimal within the values of k that are searched.
Selecting a maximum value of k to search is an open problem, but we observe a trend
that smaller k are better as j increases. See Bissias [8] for a related discussion.
We have released an open-source implementation of IBLTs in C++ with a Python
wrapper [64]. The release includes an implementation of Alg. 1 and optimal parameters
for several decode rates. Although the runtime is linear with j, for any given rate, the
parameter file can be generated once ever and be universally applicable to any IBLT





































failure rate 1/24 1/240 1/2400
static
k=4,tau=1.5
Figure 2.11: Size of optimal IBLTs (using Alg. 1) given a desired decode rate; with a
statically parameterized IBLT (k = 4, τ = 1.5) in black. For clarity, the plot is split
on the x-axis. Decode rates are shown in Fig. 2.9.
hypergraph approach executes much faster for all j. For example, to parameterize
j = 100, our approach completes in 29 seconds on average (100 trials). Allocating
actual IBLTs increases average run time to 426 seconds. The speed increase is due to
our use of hypergraphs, which are larger than IBLTs in terms of storage but are faster
to compute with.
Fig. 2.11 shows the size of IBLTs when parameterized optimally for three different
decode rates. If parameterized appropriately, the number of cells in an IBLT grows
linearly, with variations due to inherent discretization and fewer degrees of freedom in
small IBLTs.
2.4.2 Ping-Pong Decoding
Graphene takes advantage of its two IBLTs to increase the decode rate for Protocol
2. IBLTs I (and I′) and J (and J′) are different sizes, and may use a different number
of hash functions, but contain the same transactions. When an IBLT fails to decode
completely, it still can succeed partially. The transactions that are decoded from
37
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Figure 2.12: Decode rate of a single IBLT (parameterized for a 1/240 failure rate)
versus the improved ping-pong decode rate from using a second, smaller IBLT with
the same items.
J4 J′ can be removed from I4 I′, and decoding of the latter can be retried. Then,
transactions from I4 I′ can be removed from J4 J′, and decoding of the latter can
be retried; and so on in a ping-pong fashion (see Gollakota and Katabi [40]). We note
that if the count of a decoded item is 1, then it should be subtracted from the other
IBLT; if the count is −1, then it should be added to the other IBLT. The IBLTs
should use different seeds in their hash functions for independence.
Fig. 2.12 shows an experiment where we compared the decode rate of a single
IBLT parameterized to be optimally small and recover j ∈ [10, 20, 50, 100] items with
decode failure rate of 1− p = 1/240. We then inserted the same items into a second
IBLT parameterized to hold 0 < i ≤ j items. When i is the same size as j, the failure
rate is (1− p)2 or lower. But improvements can be seen for values i < j as well. When
j is small, very small values of i improve the decode rate. For larger values of j, larger
38
values of i are needed for decoding. Ping-pong decoding is computationally fast since
IBLT decoding itself is fast.
The use of ping-pong decoding on Graphene Protocol 2 is an improvement of
several orders of magnitude; results are presented in Fig. 2.17 in Section 2.5.3.2.
This approach can be extended to other scenarios that we do not investigate here.
For example, a receiver could ask many neighbors for the same block and the IBLTs
can be jointly decoded with this approach.
2.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation reaches the following conclusions:
• Graphene Protocol 1 is more efficient than using a Bloom filter alone, by
Ω(n log n) bits. For all but small n, it is more efficient than deterministic
solutions.
• We deployed Protocol 1 worldwide in Bitcoin Cash and show it performs as
expected; and our implementation of Protocol 1 for Ethereum evaluated against
historic data also shows expected gains.
• Using extensive Monte Carlo simulations, we show that Graphene Protocols 1
and 2 are always significantly smaller than Compact Blocks and XThin for a
variety of scenarios, including mempool synchronization.
• In simulation, the decode success rates of Graphene Protocols 1 and 2 are above
targeted values.
2.5.1 Comparison to Bloom Filter Alone
The information-theoretic bound on the number of bits required to describe any






n log2(m/n) bits [17]. Carter et al. also showed that an approximate solution to the
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problem has a more efficient lower bound of −n log2(f) bits by allowing for a false
positive rate of f [21].
Because our goal is to address a restricted version of this problem, Graphene
Protocol 1 is more efficient than Carter’s bound for even an optimal Bloom filter alone.
This is because Graphene Protocol 1 assumes all n elements (transactions) are stored
at the receiver, and makes use of that information whereas a Bloom filter would not.
Theorem 4. Relaying a block with n transactions to a receiver with a mempool (a
superset of the block) of m transactions is more efficient with Graphene Protocol 1
than using an optimally small Bloom filter alone, when the IBLT uses k ≥ 3 hash
functions. The efficiency gains of Graphene Protocol 1 are Ω(n log2 n).
Proof. We assume that m = cn for some constant c > 1. Our proof is asymptotic.
Thus, according to the law of large numbers, every value δ > 0 (where δ is defined as in
Theorem 1) is sufficient to achieve β-assurance when choosing values for a∗, x∗, and y∗.
Accordingly, we may proceed under the assumption that δ = 0; i.e., there is no need
to lower the false positive rate of either Bloom filter to account for deviations because
the observed false positive rate will always match its expected value asymptotically.
Let f , where 0 < f < 1, be the FPR of a Bloom filter created in order to correctly
identify n ≥ 1 elements from a set of m ≥ 1 elements. The size of the Bloom filter
that has FPR f , with n items inserted, is −n log2(f) bits [21]. Let f = pm−n , where
0 < p < 1. The expected number of false positives that can pass through the Bloom
filter is (m − n) p
(m−n) = p. Since 0 < p < 1, one out of every 1/p Bloom filters is
expected to fail.
To correctly identify the same set of items, Graphene instead uses a Bloom filter
with f = a
m−n , where we set a = n/(rτ) since the Bloom filter is optimal, and uses
an IBLT with aτ cells (r bytes each) that decodes with probability p. The expected
number of false positives that pass through Graphene’s Bloom filter is (m−n) a
(m−n) = a.
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An IBLT with 1 to a items inserted in it decodes with probability 1 − p. In other
words, one out of every 1/p Graphene blocks is expected to fail.




















where Eq. 2.5.1 follows from Theorem 1 from Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [44], given
that we have an IBLT with k ≥ 3 hash functions.
Graphene cannot replace all uses of Bloom filters, only those where the elements
are stored at the receiver, e.g., set reconciliation.
As m− n approaches zero, Protocol 1 shrinks its Bloom filter and approaches an
IBLT-only solution. The special case where Graphene has an FPR of 1 is equivalent to
not sending a Bloom filter at all; in that case, Graphene is as small as any IBLT-only
solution, as expected. As the size of m− n increases, Graphene is much smaller than
sticking with an IBLT-only solution, which would have τ(m− n) cells.
Graphene is not always smaller than deterministic solutions. As we show in
our evaluations below, for small values of n (about 50–100 or fewer depending on
constants), deterministic solutions perform better. For larger values, Graphene’s
savings are significant and increase with n.
We leave analytic claims regarding Protocol 2 for future work; however, below we



























Graphene Protocol 1 XThin*
Failure Rate: 46/15647 = 0.003
Figure 2.13: [Deployment on BCH, Protocol 1]: Performance of Protocol 1 as deployed
on the Bitcoin Cash network, where the node was connected to 6 other peers. Points
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● ● ●8 B/txn Ful Blocks Protocol 1
Fail Rate: 43/5672 = 0.0076
Figure 2.14: [Implementation, Protocol 1] An implementation of Protocol 1 for the
Geth Ethereum client run on historic data. The left facet compares against Ethereum’s




Bitcoin Cash implementation. We coded Graphene (Protocol 1) for Bitcoin
Unlimited’s Bitcoin Cash client. It appeared first in edition 1.4.0.0 (Aug 17, 2018) as
an experimental feature, and since 1.5.0.1 (Nov 5, 2018) it has been the default block
propagation technique. Currently, 686 nodes (operated by persons unknown to us)
are running Graphene on the Bitcoin Cash mainnet.
Fig. 2.13 shows results from our own peer running the protocol on the real
network from January 9–April 29, 2019. Fig. 2.13 also shows results from using
Bitcoin Unlimited’s XThin implementation; however, we have removed the cost of the
receiver’s Bloom filter to make the comparison fair (hence it is labelled XThin* ). The
cost of XThin* is computed for the same blocks. As expected, while XThin* costs
grow quickly, the costs of Graphene grow much more slowly as block size increases.
We have not yet deployed Protocol 2 (below we discuss our simulation of Protocol
2). Out of 15,647 Graphene blocks, 46 failed to decode, which is within our β-assurance
of 239/240. This statistic also confirms our two-protocol approach: most of the time
Protocol 1 is sufficient; and correcting failures with Protocol 2 is rarely needed if β is
set appropriately. And although the failure rate of Protocol 1 is low, Protocol 2 is a
necessary part of a complete solution for our probabilistic approach.
Ethereum implementation. We implemented Graphene Protocol 1 for Geth, Ether-
eum’s primary client software, and submitted a Pull Request [53]. We replayed all
the blocks produced on the Ethereum mainnet blockchain on Jan 14, 2019 (a total of
5,672 blocks), introducing new message types to comply with Graphene’s protocol.
During our test, the size of the mempool at the receiver was kept constant at 60,000
transactions, which is typical (see https://etherscan.io/chart/pendingtx). The
left facet of Fig. 2.14 shows the size in bytes of full blocks used by Ethereum and
Graphene. The right facet compares Graphene (including transaction ordering infor-
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mation) against a line showing 8 bytes/per transaction (an idealization of Compact
Blocks without overhead).
2.5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
Methodology and assumptions. We also wrote a custom block propagation
simulator for Graphene (Protocols 1 and 2) that measures the network bytes exchanged
by peers relaying blocks. We executed the protocol using real data structures so that
we could capture the probabilistic nature of Bloom filters and IBLTs. Specifically,
we used our publicly released IBLT implementation and a well-known Python Bloom
filter implementation. In results below, we varied several key parameters, including
the size of the block, the size of the receiver’s mempool, and the fraction of the block
possessed at the receiver. Each point in our plots is one parameter combination and
shows the mean of 10,000 trials or more; if no confidence interval is shown, it was very
small and removed for clarity. For all trials, we used a bound of β = 239/240 (see
Eqs. (2.3) and (2.8)).
In all experiments, we evaluated three block sizes (in terms of transactions): 200,
which is about the average size of Ethereum (ETH) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH) blocks;
2,000 which is the average size of Bitcoin (BTC) blocks; and 10,000 as an example of
a larger block scenario. In expectation of being applied to large blocks and mempools,
we used 8-byte transaction IDs for both Graphene and Compact Blocks. Also for
Compact Blocks, we used getdata messages with block encodings of 1 or 3 bytes,
depending on block size [24].
2.5.3.1 Graphene: Protocol 1
Size of blocks. Fig. 2.15 shows the cost in bytes of Graphene blocks compared
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● ●Compact Blocks Graphene
Figure 2.15: [Simulation, Protocol 1] Average size of Graphene blocks versus Compact
Blocks as the size of the mempool increases as a multiple of block size. Each facet is a
block size: (200, 2000, and 10000 transactions). (N.b., This figure varies mempool
size; Fig. 2.13 varied block size.)
these experiments, the receiver’s mempool contains all transactions in the block plus
some additional transactions, which increase along the x-axis as a multiple of the
block size. For example, at fraction 0.5 and block size 2,000, the mempool contains
3,000 transactions in total. The experiments demonstrate that Graphene’s advantage
over Compact Blocks is substantial and improves with block size. Also, the cost
of Graphene grows sublinearly as the number of extra transactions in the mempool
grows.
Decode rate. Fig. 2.16 shows the decode rate of Graphene blocks, as the mempool
size increases. In all cases, the decode rate far exceeds the desired rate, demonstrating
that our derived bounds are effective. Graphene’s decode rate suffers when the receiver
lacks the entire block in her mempool. For example, in our experiments, a receiver
holding 99% of the block can still decode 97% of the time. But if the receiver holds
less than 98% of the block, the decode rate for Protocol 1 is zero. Hence, Protocol 2
is required in such scenarios.
45
● ● ● ●
●












































Txns in mempool not in blk 

















Figure 2.16: [Simulation, Protocol 1] Decode rate of Graphene blocks with β = 239
240
(red dotted line), as block size and the number of extra transactions in the mempool
increases as a multiple of block size.
2.5.3.2 Graphene Extended: Protocol 2
Our evaluations of Protocol 2 focus on scenarios where the receiver does not possess
the entire block and m > n; we evaluate m = n as a special case.
Size by message type. Fig. 2.18 shows the cost of Graphene Extended, broken
down into message type, as the fraction of the block owned by the receiver increases.
The dashed line on the plot shows the costs for Compact Blocks, where the receiver
requests missing transactions by identifying each as a 1- or 3-byte index (depending on
block size) in the original ordered list of transactions in the block encodings [24]. (We
exclude the cost of sending the missing transactions themselves for both protocols.)
Overall, Graphene Extended is significantly smaller than Compact Blocks, and
the gains increase as the block size increases. For blocks smaller than 200, eventually
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Figure 2.17: [Simulation, Protocol 2] Decode rate of Graphene blocks with β = 239
240
,
shown by the black dotted line, as block size and the number of extra transactions in
the mempool increase. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Decode rate and Ping-Pong enhancement. Fig. 2.17 shows the decode rate of
Graphene blocks; it far exceeds the desired rate. And when ping-pong decoding is
used, the simulation results show decoding rates close to 100%.
Not shown are our simulations of the Difference Digest by Eppstein et al. [33]. The
Difference Digest is an IBLT-only solution that is an alternative to our Protocol 2. In
that work, the sender begins by telling the receiver the value n. The receiver creates
a Flajolet-Martin estimate [36] of m − n, using dlog2(m − n)e IBLTs, each with 80
cells where roughly m elements are inserted. The sender replies with a single IBLT of
twice the number of cells as the estimate (to account for an under-estimate). This
approach is several times more expensive than Graphene.
m ≈ n and mempool synchronization. As described in Section 2.3.2.1, Graphene
can be used for mempool synchronization, setting n to the size of the sender’s mempool.
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Figure 2.18: [Simulation, Protocol 2] Graphene Extended cost as the fraction of the
block owned by the receiver increases. The black dotted line is the cost of Compact
Blocks.
Graphene discussed in Section 2.3.3.1. Our evaluations of this scenario are shown in
Fig. 2.19. In these experiments, the sender’s mempool has n transactions, of which a
fraction (on the x-axis) are in common with the receiver. The receiver’s mempool size
is topped off with unrelated transactions so that m = n. As a result, Protocol 1 fails
and modifications from Section 2.3.3.1 are employed. As with previous experiments,
Graphene performs significantly better than Compact Blocks across multiple mempool
intersection sizes and improvement increases with block size.
2.6 Systems Issues
2.6.1 Security Considerations
Malformed IBLTs. It is simple to produce an IBLT that results in an endless decode
loop for a naive implementation; the attack is just as easily thwarted. To create a
malformed IBLT, the attacker incorrectly inserts an item into only k − 1 cells. When
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● ●Compact Blocks Graphene
Figure 2.19: [Simulation, Mempool Synchronization] Here m = n and the peers have a
fraction of the sender’s mempool in common on the x-axis. Graphene is more efficient,
and the advantage increases with block and mempool size.
the item is peeled off, one cell in the IBLT will contain the item with a count of -1.
When that entry is peeled, k − 1 cells will contain the item with a count of 1; and the
loop continues. The attack is thwarted if the implementation halts decoding when an
item is decoded twice. Once detected, the sender can be dropped or banned by the
receiver.
Manufactured transaction collisions. The probability of accidental collision of





attacker may use brute force search to discover and submit collisions. SipHash [3] is
used by some blockchain protocols to limit the attack to a single peer.
With or without the use of SipHash, Graphene is more resilient against such
collisions than XThin and Compact Blocks. Let t1 and t2 be transactions with IDs
that collide with at least 8 bytes. In the worst case, the block contains t1, the
sender has never seen t2, and the receiver possesses t2 but has never seen t1. In this
case, XThin and Compact Blocks will always fail; however, Graphene fails with low
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probability, fS · fR. For the attack to succeed, first, t2 must pass through Bloom filter
S as a full 32-byte ID, which occurs only with probability fS. If it does pass, the
IBLT will decode but the Merkle root will fail. At this point, the receiver will initiate
Protocol 2, sending Bloom filter R. Second, with probability fR, t1 will be a false
positive in R as a full 32-byte ID and will not be sent to the receiver.
2.6.2 Transaction Ordering Costs
Bloom filters and IBLTs operate on unordered sets, but Merkle trees require a
specific ordering. In our evaluations, we did not include the sender’s cost of specifying
a transaction ordering, which is n log2 n bits. As n grows, this cost is larger than
Graphene itself. Fortunately, the cost is easily eliminated by introducing a known
ordering of transactions in blocks. In fact, Bitcoin Cash clients deployed a Canonical
Transaction Ordering (CTOR) ordering in Fall 2018.
2.6.3 Reducing Processing Time
Profiling our implementation code revealed that processing costs are dominated
heavily by passing the receiver’s mempool against Bloom filter S in Protocol 1.
Fortunately, this cost is easily reduced. A standard Bloom filter implementation will
hash each transaction ID k times — but each ID is already the result of applying a
cryptographic hash and there is no need to hash k more times; see Suisani et al. [102].
Instead, we break the 32-byte transaction ID into k pieces. Applying this solution
reduced average receiver processing in our Ethereum implementation from 17.8ms to
9.5ms. Alternative techniques [28, 29, 54] are also effective and not limited to small
values of k.
2.6.4 Limitations
Graphene is a solution for set reconciliation where there is a trade-off between
transmission size, complexity (in terms of network round-trips), and success rate. In
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contrast, popular alternatives such as Compact Blocks [24] have predictable transmis-
sion size, fixed transmission complexity, use a trivial algorithm, and always succeed.
Graphene’s performance gains over related work increase as block size grows, but it is
a probabilistic solution with a (tunable) failure rate. We do not claim to have the
optimal solution for propagating blocks, nor for scaling blockchains in general.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SAFE AND SELDONIAN
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ALGORITHMS
3.1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms have been proposed for many high-risk
applications, such as improving type 1 diabetes and sepsis treatments [57, 108]. One
type of safe RL algorithm [105, 107], subsequently referred to as Safe and/or Seldonian
RL [108], enables these high-risk applications by providing high-confidence guarantees
that the application will not cause undesirable behavior like increasing the frequency
of dangerous patient outcomes.
However, existing safe RL algorithms rely on the assumption that training data
is free from anomalies such as errors, missing entries, and malicious attacks. In real
applications, anomalies are common when training data comes from a pipeline that
includes human interactions, natural language processing, device malfunctions, etc.
For example, the recent application of RL to sepsis treatment in the intensive care
unit (ICU) used training data generated from hand-written doctors’ notes [57]. In a
high-stress ICU environment, missing records and poorly written notes are difficult to
automatically parse [2]. Furthermore, Petit et al. [92] demonstrated the importance of
using reliable training data for self-driving cars, a potential area for the real application
of RL. They executed a series of attacks on the camera and sensors of self-driving cars
in a lab environment to demonstrate how the safety of passengers can be compromised.
In this chapter, we analyze how robust Seldonian RL algorithms are to perturbations
in data. Specifically, we analyze the robustness of a specific component, called the
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safety test. This component makes current Seldonian algorithms safe: the safety test
checks whether necessary safety constraints are satisfied with high probability. Using
data collected from a baseline policy, it outputs new policies that are highly likely
to perform at least as well as the baseline. The safety test first computes estimates
of the expected performance of a new policy from training data, using importance
sampling (IS). It then uses concentration inequalities (CI) to bound the expectation
of the IS estimates.
First, we propose a new measure, which we call α-security, for quantifying how
robust the safety test of a Seldonian RL algorithm is to data anomalies. To create this
measure, we define an attacker that adds adversarially corrupt data points to training
data. Although anomalies in data are often not due to an adversarial attacker, if
we create algorithms that are robust to adversarial attacks, they will also be robust
to non-adversarial anomalies in data. Second, we analyze the security of existing
safety test mechanisms using α-security, and find that even if only one data point is
corrupted, the high-confidence safety guarantees provided by several Seldonian RL
algorithms can be egregiously violated. Then we propose a new algorithm that is
more robust to anomalies in training data, ensuring safety with high probability when
an upper bound on the number of adversarially corrupt data points is known. Finally,
we present experiments that support our theoretical analysis.
Our work is directly applicable to any scenario that requires computing confidence
intervals around IS estimates. More broadly, the community is also interested in our
definition of safety [38] and its limitations [45], and IS [14, 51, 70, 75]. Lastly, our
α-security formalization also pertains to high-confidence methods that do not use IS




A Markov decision process (MDP) is a mathematical model of the environment
with which an agent interacts. Formally, it is a tuple (S,A,P ,R, d0, γ). S is the
set of possible states of the environment. St is the state of the environment at
time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . }. A is the set of actions that an agent interacting with the
environment can take. At is the action chosen by the agent at time t. For notational
simplicity, we assume that A and S are finite.1 P : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the
transition function, which characterizes the distribution of St+1 given St and At, using
the definition P(s, a, s′) := Pr(St+1=s′|St=s, At=a). The reward provided to the
agent at time t is a bounded real-valued random variable, Rt. The reward function
R : S × A → [Rmin, Rmax] captures sufficient information about the distribution of
rewards given St and At in order to reason about optimal behavior, and is defined
by R(s, a) := E[Rt|St=s, At=a]. The initial distribution of states is captured by
d0 : S → [0, 1], i.e., d0(s) := Pr(S0=s). Finally, γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter used to
discount rewards based on the time at which they occur.
We consider episodic MDPs, which contain a special state s∞, called the terminal
absorbing state. Once the agent enters state s∞, it can never leave and all subsequent
rewards are zero. Upon reaching s∞, the trial, called an episode, has effectively ended
because there are no more rewards to be obtained. Although in theory the agent will
continue transitioning from s∞ back to s∞ forever, in practice, we can begin the next
episode. We say that a problem has a finite horizon, τ , if Sτ = s∞ almost surely,
regardless of how actions are chosen. A trajectory H is the sequence of states, actions,
and rewards from one episode: H = (S0, A0, R0, . . . , Sτ−1, Aτ−1, Rτ−1).
The mechanism for selecting actions within an agent is called a policy, which we
denote by π : S ×A → [0, 1], where π(s, a) := Pr(At=a|St=s). We consider the batch
1Our work generalizes to continuous MDPs as well, but care must be taken to select πe such that
importance sampling weights are bounded.
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RL setting wherein training data D, also referred to as the safety data, consists of
trajectories generated using a single baseline policy πb, called the behavior policy. The





t to denote the state, action, and reward at time t in the i
th trajectory in
D. If H denotes the set of all possible trajectories, each policy induces a distribution
over H. We abuse notation by reusing π, and write supp(πb) to denote the support
of this distribution. Let Hπb = supp(πb), i.e., the set of all trajectories that can be
created by running πb.




tRt. The goal of the agent is to find a policy that maximizes the




tRt|π], where conditioning on π denotes that At ∼ π(St, ·) for all t.
To simplify notation later, we assume that
∑τ−1
t=0 γ
tRt ∈ [0, 1].2
3.2.1 Safe Reinforcement Learning
Let a be a function that takes a dataset as input and produces a policy as output,
i.e., a(D) is the policy output by the algorithm a when run on training data D. Given
a user-specified constant δ ∈ [0, 1] (typically δ = 0.05 or δ = 0.01), a Seldonian RL
algorithm is any algorithm a that satisfies
Pr(J(a(D)) ≥ J(πb)) ≥ 1− δ. (3.1)
That is, the algorithm guarantees that with probability at least 1− δ, it will return a
policy with expected return at least equal to that of the behavior policy. For simplicity,
we assume that J(πb) is known—in previous work, J(πb), written instead as ρ(πb), was
left as a user-specified constant, for example a high-confidence upper bound on J(πb).
2This is equivalent to assuming that rewards are bounded, since given a finite horizon, the returns
can be normalized.
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Note that an algorithm that always returns πb is technically safe. However, our goal
is to develop safe algorithms that frequently return policies that have larger expected
return than πb, while satisfying the safety guarantee in Eq. (3.1). In this framework, a
user can define many different reward functions that improvement can be guaranteed
with respect to (w.r.t.). This enables users to define safety constraints using reward
functions. For discussion of how this provides a useful interface for defining safety
constraints, see the work of Thomas et al. [108].
Several Seldonian RL algorithms have a component called the safety test, which
ensures that Eq. (3.1) is satisfied [79, 107, 108]. The safety test takes three inputs: 1)
A policy πe that is evaluated for safety, referred to as the evaluation policy ; 2) The
safety data, D; and 3) J(πb). If there is sufficient confidence that J(πe) ≥ J(πb), the
safety test returns True; otherwise, it returns False.
First, using each trajectory in D, the safety test computes n estimates of the
expected performance of πe. For this estimation, we make the standard assumption
that πb(s, a) = 0 implies πe(s, a) = 0.
3 One method for estimating the expected
value of a function when samples come from a different distribution (πb) than the
desired distribution (πe) is importance sampling. In Seldonian RL, the safety test
uses IS to produce an unbiased estimator of J(πe) from D [96]. Specifically, for
each trajectory in D, it computes an importance weighted return that is defined by:
Ĵ?(πe|Hi, πb) := g(Hi)w?(Hi, πe, πb), where w?(Hi, πe, πb) is the importance weight. For










t). For weighted importance






















t). Notice that WIS normalizes the importance weights using
the sum of the importance weights in all trajectories. Given that πb(s, a) = 0 implies
πe(s, a) = 0, IS is strongly consistent and unbiased, while WIS is strongly consistent,
3In the more general setting, where A and S are not finite, this assumption corresponds to
requiring πe to be absolutely continuous with respect to πb.
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but typically biased [106]. For the remainder of the chapter, we use ? ∈ {IS, WIS} to
denote weights computed using IS or WIS.
Second, the safety test uses concentration inequalities to bound the expectation of
the importance weighted returns. A CI provides probability bounds on how a random
variable deviates from its expectation. Let X denote the importance weighted returns
obtained from the trajectories in D, i.e., X := {Xi : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Xi = Ĵ?(πe|Hi, πb)}.
Safety tests leverage CIs to lower bound the performance of πe, using X. A commonly
used CI is the Chernoff-Hoeffding (CH) inequality [47], which states the following:
For n independent, real-valued, and bounded random variables, X1, . . . , Xn, such that
Pr(Xi ∈ [0, b]) = 1 and E[Xi] = µ, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where b ∈ R, with probability





Let L∗,?(πe, D) denote the 1− δ confidence lower bound on J(πe), calculated using
weighting scheme ? and CI ∗, where ∗ ∈ {CH}. Let ϕ denote a safety test such that
ϕ(πe, D, J(πb)) ∈ {True, False}. Given πe and data D collected from πb, ϕ returns
True (i.e., the safety test passes) if L∗,?(πe, D) ≥ J(πb); otherwise, ϕ returns False.
For brevity, we use L∗,? to denote the 1−δ confidence lower bound on J(πe), calculated
using any dataset.
3.3 Related Work
This chapter arguably falls under the broad body of work aimed at creating
algorithms that can withstand uncertainty introduced at any stage of the RL framework.
Some works view a component as an adversary with stochastic behavior. For an
overview of risk-averse methods, e.g., those that incorporate stochasticity into the
system, refer to the work of Garcia and Fernandez [37].
Other works incorporate an adversary to model worst-case scenarios. In a model-free
setting, Morimoto and Doya [85] introduced Robust RL that models the environment
as an adversary to address parameter uncertainty in MDPs. Pinto et al. [94] extend
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this work to non-linear policies that are represented as neural networks. Lim et al. [66]
consider MDPs with some adversarial state-action pairs. In model-based settings, i.e.,
those that build an explicit model of the system, although an adversary is not present,
worst-case analyses assume different components of an MDP are unknown [88, 98, 112].
Using the definition of safety we have introduced, Ghavamzadeh et al. [38] and
Laroche et al. [62] created algorithms for learning safe policies in a model-based
setting. Although we are also interested in ensuring security for these approaches, we
focus on a model-free setting that requires a different set of assumptions and attacker
model.
Learning in the presence of an adversary has also been studied in multi-agent RL,
where agents have competing goals [68, 93, 100]. Similar to our work, there have been
efforts to study the affect of adversarial inputs to algorithms, and create systems that
are “robust” to adversarial manipulation, in multi-armed bandits [46, 52, 69, 116, 117]
and on image related tasks in deep RL [20, 49, 58]. To our knowledge, there has not
been any research on analyzing adversarial attacks on Seldonian RL.
Outside RL, to increase the robustness of supervised and semi-supervised learning,
methods have been proposed during training to play adversarial games [32, 42], and
to generate adversarial examples [43].
3.4 Problem Formulation
We focus on a worst-case setting, where an attacker modifies training data to
maximize the probability that the Seldonian RL algorithm returns an unsafe policy.
When the stakes are high—for example, in the application of RL to sepsis treatment
in the ICU, wherein training data is generated from hand-written doctors’ notes—we
do not want to assume that training data contains only minor errors, such as patient
height, but also major ones, such as wrong drug or patient name.
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Specifically, we will consider the case where the attacker can add k fabricated
trajectories to the safety data D. This is related to the case where the attacker can
change k of the trajectories in the data—in that setting, the attacker would identify
k trajectories to change, and then would replace them with k new ones. After the
attacker has identified the k trajectories to change, they are faced with the problem
that we solve: which k trajectories to add after the original k were removed.
There are two ways for the safety test to fail: 1) If J(πe) ≥ J(πb), the attacker
can minimize the estimated performance of πe by adding k trajectories; and 2) If
J(πe) < J(πb), the attacker can maximize the estimated performance of πe by adding
k trajectories. We focus on the latter attacker because the prior case does not cause
a poor policy to pass the safety test, but only prevents the identification of a good
policy. Therefore, we only consider an attacker who is interested in enabling a worse
policy than the behavior policy to pass the safety test. The attacker has the same
knowledge inputted to ϕ, which consists of: 1) The behavior policy, πb, that generated
D; 2) J(πb); 3) The evaluation policy, πe; 4) The CI, ∗, used by ϕ; 5) The method to
compute importance weights, ?; 6) The confidence level, δ; 7) The dataset, D.
Let Dπbn = {D : D ⊆ Hπb and |D| = n}, i.e., the set of all possible datasets of
size n, created by running πb. For all k ∈ Z+, let m : Dπbn × Z+ → D
πb
n+k be the
attack function, which indicates a strategy that an attacker might use when appending
fabricated trajectories to the dataset. That is, for D ∈ Dπbn , m(D, k) ∈ D
πb
n+k is the
dataset created by using attack strategy m to append k trajectories to D with size n.
Let M denote the set of all possible attack functions m. For notational completeness,
we note that m is actually a function of Dπbn , Z+ and items 1–6 enumerated in the
previous paragraph. However, we omit these items for brevity.
Next, we define α-security, which provides one way of quantifying how robust a
safety test (and thus a Seldonian algorithm relying on a safety test) is to adversarial
perturbations of data in terms of a parameter, α ≥ 0, such that smaller values of
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α correspond to more robustness. We use the following assumptions when defining
α-security:
Assumption 1 (Inferior πe). J(πe) < J(πb).
Assumption 2 (Absolute continuity). ∀a ∈ A,∀s ∈ S,
(
πb(s, a) = 0
)
=⇒(
πe(s, a) = 0
)
.
Assumption 3 (ϕ safety). We only consider safety tests that ensure Eq. (3.1) is




= True, and πb otherwise.
That is, given Assumption 1, ϕ must satisfy Pr(ϕ(πe, D, J(πb)) = True) < δ.
Recall that the attacker is interested in enabling a worse policy than πb to pass the
safety test by appending trajectories to D. In order to succeed, they must manipulate
the metric used for decision making by the safety test, i.e., artificially increase L∗,?,
the 1− δ confidence lower bound on J(πe).
Our definition ensures Eq. (3.1) is satisfied even if D has been corrupted. In fact,
an undesirable policy passing the safety test with probability at most δ, must hold
across all attack functions, which includes the best attack strategy—one that causes
the largest increase in L∗,?. This artificial increase in L∗,?, due to the best attack
strategy, is represented by α, which we write as a function of n, k, πb, πe and δ.
Definition 1 (α-security). Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, ϕ is secure with constant










If a safety test does not satisfy Assumption 3, we can not easily analyze its
α-security. For example, any ϕ using WIS variants does not satisfy Assumption 3
because many CIs often rely on the independence of samples to guarantee probabilistic
bounds on their mean. WIS creates dependence between samples by normalizing the
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importance weights. However, WIS variants are more likely to be used by safety tests
because they work better in practice and require less data than IS. Therefore, to
include WIS in our analysis, we define quasi-α-security to be the following.
Definition 2 (Quasi-α-security). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, ϕ is quasi-secure



















Note that Eq. (3.3) implies α-security if ϕ is “safe”. If it is not (as in WIS variants),
then ϕ can be quasi-α-secure, which still gives us a way to measure its robustness to
perturbations/attacks on data.
Notice that our definition does not consider how πe is chosen because the violation
of safety comes primarily from the safety test. In addition to the attacker model,
our worst-case analysis also stems from this definition of security, which assumes
that πe has lower performance than πb, but does not quantify how often this occurs.
Attacking the data used to select πe can increase this frequency, but would not change
the definition of α-security.
3.5 Analysis of Existing Algorithms
In this section, we present our main contribution which quantifies the α-security of
different off-policy performance estimators. Notice that every safety test is α-secure
with α =∞, since the test whether L∗,? > J(πb) +∞ will always return False. So,
when comparing two estimators, it is not sufficient to compare arbitrary values of α
for which they are α-secure. Instead, we define the notion of a minimum α, which we
refer to as α∗.
Definition 3 (Tight α). ϕ is quasi-secure or secure with tight constant α∗ if and
only if α∗ = min{α : ϕ is quasi-α-secure or α-secure}.
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The value of α can be interpreted as the largest possible increase in L∗,? when
an attacker adds k trajectories to D. To compute α∗, given a random dataset, we
first must determine the optimal attack strategy, where this increase is largest. This
strategy can be determined using the following realization: LCH, IS and LCH, WIS are
both increasing functions w.r.t. the IS weight and return. Therefore, for a given k,
the optimal attack is to create a trajectory that maximizes the value of the IS weight
and return. This strategy incurs the maximum “damage” by the attacker.
Notice that fake trajectories created using this strategy are those that have not
been performed in the real MDP environment. However, because the transition and
reward functions are not known, a practitioner can not distinguish real and fake
trajectories. Rare events are critical to account for in RL, and may look like fake
trajectories. Perhaps impossible trajectories can be identified using domain-specific
knowledge, but that must be analyzed on a per-domain basis.
Second, computing α∗ requires identifying the dataset on which the attack strategy
is most effective, i.e., the determination of D ∈ Dπbn that yields the greatest increase
in L∗,?. However, this is not possible since the distribution of trajectories for a given
πe is unknown, and thus, Dπbn is unknown.
Instead, we propose the use of a different value, α′, which may be slightly loose
relative to the tight α∗, but which we expect captures the relative robustness of the
methods that we compare. Instead of D ∈ Dπbn , D ∈ DHn is selected, on which the
attacker executes the optimal strategy. In other words, the dataset is chosen out of all
datasets of size n created by H, the set of all trajectories that can be created by any
policy. In Theorem 5, we present the values of α′ for each estimator.
Theorem 5. ϕ is quasi-secure or secure with α ≥ α′, where the values of α′ are
presented in Table 3.1.
Proof. In Section 3.8.1, we prove that LCH, IS and LCH, WIS are increasing functions
w.r.t. the IS weight and return. The largest IS weight is a function of πb, πe and τ , and
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the largest return is always 1. Let any off-policy performance estimator, L∗,?(πe, D),
be written as a function f that incorporates an attacker strategy. In other words,
L∗,?(πe,m(D, k)) = f
∗,?(D,wy, gy, k), where wy is the IS weight and gy is the return,
computed from the trajectory added by the attacker. That is, f ∗,?(D,wy, gy, k) is the
result of applying CI ∗ and weighting scheme ? to D that includes k copies of H∗,
which is the trajectory added by the attacker. H∗ has an IS weight of wy and return
of gy.
The optimal attack strategy causes the largest increase in L∗,? such that L∗,?(πe,m(D, k))−
L∗,?(πe, D) is maximized. In Lemma 5 in Section 3.8.1, we prove that an appropri-
ate setting of α is equal to or greater than the largest increase in L∗,? across all
datasets, D ∈ Dπbn , and all attack functions. By Lemma 1, a safety test using L∗,? is





− L∗,?(πe, D). (3.4)




− L∗,?(πe, D)}, i.e., permissi-
ble values of α∗ obtained from eachD ∈ Dπbn . Let α∗ = maxD∈Dπbn maxm∈M L
∗,?(πe,m(D, k))−
L∗,?(πe, D). For all u ∈ U ,
u ≤maxD∈Dπbn maxm∈M L
∗,?(πe,m(D, k))− L∗,?(πe, D)
= maxD∈Dπbn f
∗,?(D, i∗, 1, k)− L∗,?(πe, D). (3.5)
Besides the optimal attacker strategy, if the distribution of trajectories for a given
πe was also known, the right-hand side of Eq. (3.5), which is α
∗, would be computable.
Instead, an upper bound of α∗ is
α∗ < maxD∈DHn f
∗,?(D, i∗, 1, k)− L∗,?(πe, D) = α′, (3.6)
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Table 3.1: α–security of current methods (center); settings for clipping
weight, c, for α-security written in terms of a user-specified k and α (right).
























































where DHn = {D : D ⊆ H and |D| = n}. Substituting the definition of f ∗,? and L∗,?
into the right-hand side of Eq. (3.6) for various weighting schemes and CIs, we solve
for a clean expression for α′, presented in Table 3.1. For algebraic details, refer to
Section 3.8.2. This upper bound, α′, of α∗ satisfies Eq. (3.4), implying that any α
such that α ≥ α′ also satisfies Eq. (3.4).
Recall the following to interpret Table 3.1: 1) The IS weight is a ratio of the
probability of observing a trajectory under πe to that of πb; 2) We only consider
MDPs with finite length, τ . The largest IS weight, i∗, is a function of πe, πb and τ .
To compute i∗: 1) Through brute search, for a single time step, a state and action
pair is selected such that the ratio of its probability under πe to πb is maximized; 2)
If this ratio is greater than 1, the pair is repeated for the length of the trajectory,
exponentially increasing the IS weight. Notice that as imin → 0, the third term of α′
for WIS equals 1. Plus, due to the normalization of IS weights, importance weighted
returns are always bounded by 1 for WIS. Therefore, α′ for WIS is much smaller than
that of IS, and in the worst-case, is slightly over 1. The α′ for IS is roughly the same
as that of WIS, but scaled by i∗ that can be massive.
The conclusion to draw is not that WIS is more robust than IS because α-security
does not capture the whole story. The difference in true performance of πe and πb, in
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addition to how accurate LCH,∗ estimates the performance of πe on a given uncorrupted
dataset, both contribute to the robustness of the estimators to data anomalies. Yet
α-security is useful for deciding whether πe is worth evaluating for a given estimator.
As α′ increases, L∗,? can artificially be increased by a greater amount; hence, given
the choice of two evaluation policies, a practitioner might pick the policy with lower
α′. If α′ = 0, ϕ for πe is highly robust against an adversary.
Although we focus on Chernoff-Hoeffding, our analysis also extends to other bounds
such as Azuma [4] and Bernstein [77]. Moreover, per-decision importance sampling and
weighted per-decision importance sampling are equivalent to IS and WIS, respectively,
when rewards are at the end of a trajectory. So, our analysis applies to these specific
cases as well.
3.6 Panacea: An Algorithm for Safe and Secure Policy Im-
provement
In this section, we describe our algorithm Panacea, named after the Greek goddess
of healing, that provides α-security, with a user-specified α, if the number of corrupt
trajectories in D is upper bounded. That is, the important additional input to the
algorithm is the number of adversarial trajectories. The algorithm also takes as input
all the information that the attacker already knows; except, is agnostic to which or
how many of the trajectories in m(D, k) have been corrupted.
Panacea caps the importance weights using some clipping weight, c. First intro-
duced for RL by Bottou et al. [14], clipping works by computing all the IS weights
in D and capping the weights to c, i.e., if any IS weight is greater than c, it is set to
c. Given a user-specified α and k as input, Panacea computes c, using the values in
Table 3.1. It then creates a clipped version of the dataset, denoted by Panacea(D, c).
For pseudocode, refer to Algorithm 2 in Section 3.8.3. In Corollary 1, we show that
when k is chosen correctly, our algorithm meets a user-specified level of security against
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an attacker, whose optimal strategy does not change even if they know we are using
Panacea. In Corollary 2, we discuss how the clipping weights are computed.
Corollary 1. If the user upper bounds k, Panacea is quasi-secure or secure with
α ≥ α′, where α′ is user-specified.
Proof. The behavior of L∗,? does not change with Panacea: L∗,? is increasing w.r.t.
the IS weight and return, regardless of their range of values. So, the optimal attacker
strategy remains the same. Let k denote the number of adversarial trajectories added
by the attacker, and k′ denote the input provided to Panacea by the user. When this
value is upper bounded correctly, k′ = k, and Panacea computes a clipping weight for
the given estimator, denoted by c∗,?, using Table 3.1. By Theorem 5, the security of
Panacea is
maxD∈DHn maxm∈M L
∗,?(πe, Panacea(m(D, k), c∗,?))− L∗,?(πe, Panacea(D, c∗,?))
= maxD∈DHn f







In Section 3.8.3.1, we solve for a clean expression in Eq. (3.7) by substituting in
the definition of f ∗,?, L∗,? and c∗,? for various weighting schemes and CIs, and then
simplifying the expression.
Corollary 2. If the user upper bounds k, Panacea is quasi-α-secure or α-secure with
the values of c in Table 3.1.
Proof. If the number of adversarial trajectories in D is upper bounded, rewriting
Eq. (3.7) in terms of c∗,?, and then solving Eq. (3.7) for a clean expression for c∗,?
by substituting α′, k and L∗,? with the user-specified inputs, equals the clipping
66
weights found in Table 3.1 for different estimators. For algebraic details, refer to
Section 3.8.3.2.
Panacea is more secure than existing methods if the user correctly determines k
and selects a value of α that is less than that of existing methods. Only then is c < i∗,
and Panacea clips the k largest IS weights in m(D, k) to c. Additionally, if c < In,
where In is the largest IS weight in the uncorrupted dataset D, then some values in
D are also clipped. Table 3.2 in Section 3.8.3 is the same as the middle column of
Table 3.1 with one modification: i∗ are replaced with c. As c decreases, more values
are collapsed, LCH,? is lower, and the probability of returning πb is higher.
3.7 Empirical Evaluation
We quantify the α-security of two safety tests, with and without Panacea, applied
to two domains: a grid-world, where the deployment of an unsafe policy has low-stakes,
and a diabetes treatment simulation, where the deployment of an unsafe policy could
lead to very dangerous outcomes.
3.7.1 Experimental Methodology and Application Domains
Grid-world. In a classic 3× 3 grid-world, the agent’s goal is to reach the bottom-
right corner of the grid, starting from the top-left corner. When viewed as an MDP,
actions correspond to directions the agent can move, and states correspond to its
current location on the grid. The agent receives a reward of 1, discounted by γt, if
they reach the bottom-right corner; otherwise all rewards are 0.
Diabetes Treatment Simulation. For the diabetes treatment simulation, we
use a Python implementation [115] of an FDA-approved type 1 diabetes Mellitus
simulator (T1DMS) by Kovatchev et al. [59] and Man et al. [74]. The simulator
simulates the metabolism of a patient with type 1 diabetes, where the body does
not make enough insulin, a hormone needed for moving glucose into cells. Insulin
67
pumps have a bolus calculator that determines how much insulin, specifically known
as bolus insulin, must be injected into the body before having a meal. One type of
bolus calculator is parameterized by two real-valued parameters, CR and CF. The
MDP view of the simulator represents the bolus calculator as a policy, injection doses
as actions, and states as the patient’s body’s reactions to consuming meals and getting
insulin injections. We adopt a similar reward function used in previous work that
penalizes any deviation from optimum levels of blood glucose [5].
Data Collection. We use RL to search the space of policies for grid-world, and
the space of probability distributions over policies for the diabetes domain [108]. For
the latter case, we assign the mode of a triangular distribution to a value sampled
uniformly from range [5, 50] for CR and [1, 31] for CF—admissible ranges for any
diabetic patient. Also, both triangular distributions have the same range from which
CR and CF values are sampled. The two modes parameterize the policy space
over which we sample policies. D is created by sampling a CR and CF pair from
their respective distributions, and observing the return. This reformulation is a
bandit problem, where the action corresponds to picking the modes of two triangular
distributions from which to sample CR and CF.
Let π(v, u, θ1, θ2) denote a policy representing the joint probability of sampling v
under a triangular distribution with mode θ1 and range [5, 50], and sampling u under a
triangular distribution with mode θ2 and range [1, 31]. Instead of finding a trajectory
with the largest IS weight and return, the optimal attack strategy is selecting a CR′ and
CF′ such that the ratio of their joint probability under πe to that of πb is maximized, i.e.,
arg maxCR′∈[5,50] arg maxCF′∈[1,31] πe(CR
′,CF′, θ3, θ4)/πb(CR
′,CF′, θ1, θ2). The attacker
then adds k copies of CR′ and CF′, along with a return of 1, to D. Our results show
that corrupting D collected from adult#003 within T1DMS can cause a Seldonian
RL algorithm to select a bad policy, i.e., a new distribution over policies with lower
return than πb.
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3.7.2 Results and Discussion
We evaluated the number of trajectories that must to be added to D before ϕ
incorrectly returns unsafe policies with probability more than δ. The goal is not to
show how much data it takes to “break” each method—the goal is to show that,
without Panacea, both methods are extremely fragile. For our experimental setup, we
selected two policies per domain. We estimated J(πb) ≈ 0.797 and J(πe) ≈ 0.728 for
grid-world, and J(πb) ≈ 0.218 and J(πe) ≈ 0.145 for the diabetes domain, by averaging
returns obtained from running each policy 10,000 times. We added k adversarial
trajectories based on the optimal attacker strategy to a randomly created D of size
1,500. We executed the safety test by comparing J(πb) to L
CH,?, computed using the
corrupt data. Figure 3.1 shows the average LCH,? over 750 trials, as k increases. The
error bars for variance are so small that they are negligible. Although not shown, the
average probability of passing the safety test across all trials is around 0% before and
100% after the blue and red lines cross the black dotted line, representing J(πb).
The results without Panacea show that LCH, IS and LCH, WIS cross the black dotted
line at k = 49 and k = 1, respectively, for both domains. For WIS, it only takes a
single trajectory for ϕ to return an unsafe policy; for IS, 49 trajectories only constitute
3.2% of D, where |D| = 1,549. This could correspond to a morning’s worth of data
collected from an incorrectly parameterized insulin pump, or the temporary period
over which the sensors of a self-driving car are not working due to severe weather
conditions. Notice that these results are not indicative of IS being less sensitive
than WIS: Because WIS estimates performance more accurately, small changes in its
estimate cause the incorrect conclusion that J(πe) > J(πb).
For Panacea, we computed the clipping weights, found in Table 3.1 per estimator,
using the user-specified α and the actual number of adversarial trajectories added
by the attacker. Our method never crosses the black dotted line for either domain
at α = 0.1 with IS; and it requires 65 adversarial trajectories to break rather than
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a single trajectory for the diabetes domain at α = 0.01 with WIS. Notice how the
parameter settings affect α-security: 1) As α increases, so does the clipping weight.
2) As k increases, the clipping weight decreases to counteract the artificial increase
of LCH,? due to corrupt trajectories. In the worst-case—when the user inputs an α
that is greater than the α′ of existing methods—Panacea requires the same number
of adversarial trajectories to break as if not used because D is not clipped at all.
One of the practical considerations when deploying Panacea is estimating the
number of corrupt trajectories in training data. For areas such as natural language
processing and computer vision, a user might address this concern by using known
error rates in the data processing pipelines of well-known models. Also, choosing a
meaningful value for α might be challenging. Domain-specific knowledge of the range
of performance for different policies—especially the difference in performance between
good and bad policies—can be useful. But notice that WIS estimates are always
bounded by 1, and in practice, IS estimates are even smaller—when computing the IS
weight, the probability of a trajectory under πe is often much smaller than that of
πb. The middle column in Table 3.1 is usually ≥ 1, indicating that standard methods
can be completely broken (make pessimal policies appear optimal) easily. The right
column shows values of c that make Panacea α-secure for any α ∈ [0,∞]. However,
plugging in α ∈ [0, 1] such that α ≤ α′ gives Panacea a meaningful security guarantee.
3.8 Supplementary Proofs
3.8.1 Analysis of Existing Algorithms
Let f ∗,? denote a function that incorporates an attacker strategy. When k = 0,
fCH, IS(D,wy, gy, k) is the result of applying the CH inequality to the IS weighted
returns, obtained from D, which additionally includes k copies of a trajectory with an
IS weight of wy and return of gy. Notice that f
∗,? is written in terms of IS weights.
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Number of adversarial trajectories added to dataset of size 1,500
Figure 3.1: Mean fCH, * as k increases with magnified view (right). Facets
represent the value of α inputted to Panacea, and do not matter for existing methods,
labelled as “without Panacea”. For IS, Panacea crosses the black dotted line at
k = 59, 53 and 49 for the diabetes domain, and k = 68, 55 and 50 for grid-world,
when α = 0.5, 1 and 5, respectively. For WIS, Panacea crosses the black dotted line
at k = 65, 65 and 1 for the diabetes domain, when α = 0.01, 0.5 and 1, respectively.
Panacea, using WIS, does not cross the black dotted line for grid-world.
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For the rest of the section, we use the following notation. Let I = {I : ∃a ∈ A,∃s ∈
S, I =
∏τ−1
t=0 πe(At = a, St = s)/πb(At = a, St = s)}, i.e., the set of all IS weights that
could be obtained from policies πe and πb. The maximum and minimum IS weight is
denoted by i∗ = max(I) and imin = min(I), respectively. For shorthand, let the sum
of IS weights in D be written as β =
∑n
i=1wi. Also, we assume that β > 0 to ensure
that WIS is well-defined.
Next, we define a new term to describe how an attacker can increase the 1 − δ
confidence lower bound on the mean of a bounded and real-valued random variable. We
say that f ∗,? is adversarially monotonic given its inputs, if an attacker can maximize
f ∗,? by maximizing the value of the added samples. For brevity, we say that f ∗,? is
adversarially monotonic.
Definition 4. f ∗,? is adversarially monotonic for n > 1, k > 0, πb, πe and D if both
1. There exists two constants p ≥ 0 and q ∈ [0, 1], with pq ∈ [0, i∗], such that
f ∗,?(D, p, q, k) ≥ f ∗,?(D, p, q, 0), i.e., adding k copies of pq does not decrease f ;
2. ∂
∂gy
f ∗,?(D, i∗, gy, k) ≥ 0 and ∂∂wy f
∗,?(D,wy, 1, k) ≥ 0, with no local maximums,
i.e., f is a non-decreasing function w.r.t. the IS weight and return added by the
attacker, respectively.
Definition 4 means that f ∗,? is maximized when wy and gy is maximized. In other
words, the optimal strategy is to add k copies of the trajectory with the maximum IS
weight and return. Notice that f ∗,? does not incorporate all possible attack functions,
M: specifically, the set of attacks, where the attacker can choose to add k different
trajectories, is omitted. As described in Theorem 5, to perform a worst-case analysis,
only the optimal attack must be incorporated as part of f ∗,?.
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In the following two lemmas, we show that a couple well-known Seldonian algo-
rithms are adversarially monotonic.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, fCH, IS is adversarially monotonic.















and gy = 1. To show
that wygy ∈ [0, i∗] as stated in (1) in Definition 4, it must be that wy ∈ [0, i∗]. For all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, wigi ∈ [0, i∗]. Thus, for any given dataset, 0 ≤ 1/n
∑n
i=1wigi ≤ i∗/n.

































































Therefore, wy can be selected such that wygy ∈ [0, i∗]. It follows that


















































=fCH, IS(D,wy, gy, 0).
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Next, we show that (2) in Definition 4 holds.
∂
∂wy


















































Notice that both partial derivatives are non-negative when gy = 1 and wy = i
∗, respec-
tively. To find any critical points, the following equations are solved simultaneously:
∂/∂gyf
CH, WIS(D,wy, gy, k) = 0 and ∂/∂wyf
CH, WIS(D,wy, gy, k) = 0. Notice that
points along the line (wg, 0) and (0, gy) are all critical points. The following partial
derivatives are computed to classify these points.
∂
∂(wy)2
(D,wy, gy, k) =0.
∂
∂(gy)2
(D,wy, gy, k) =0.
∂
∂gywy





















which is less than zero. Therefore, points along the line (wg, 0) and (0, gy) are saddle
points.
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Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, fCH, WIS is adversarially monotonic.
Proof. First, we show that (1) in Definition 4 holds with gy = 1 and wy = 0.
































=fCH, WIS(D,wy, gy, 0),















































Notice that Eq. (3.9) is non-negative: 1) When gy = 1, Eq. (3.9) is positive as long as
there exists at least one gi < 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; 2) If all gi = 1 in D, then Eq. (3.9)














which is also non-negative. To find any critical points, the following equations are solved
simultaneously: ∂/∂gyf
CH, WIS(D,wy, gy, k) = 0 and ∂/∂wyf
CH, WIS(D,wy, gy, k) = 0.
Notice that Eq. (3.10) is zero when wy = 0. Plugging wy = 0 into ∂/∂wyf
CH, WIS(D,wy, gy, k) =























The following partial derivatives are computed to classify whether (0,
∑n
i=1 wigi/β) is a
minimum, maximum or saddle point:
∂
∂(wy)2








(D,wy, gy, k) =0.
∂
∂gywy
































which is less that zero. Therefore, (wy = 0, gy =
∑n
i=1 wigi/β) is a saddle point.
Next, we describe the trajectory that must be added to D to execute the optimal
attack.





D,wy = w(H, πe, πb), gy = g(H), k
)
.







> 1, let H∗ = {S0 = s′, A0 = a′, R0 = 1, . . . , Sτ−1 =
s′, Aτ−1 = a
′, Rτ−1 = 1}. Otherwise, let H∗ = {S0 = s′, A0 = a′, R0 = 1}.
Theorem 6. For any adversarially monotonic off-policy estimator, the optimal attack
strategy is to add k repetitions of H∗ to D.











D, i∗, g∗, k
)
.
For any off-policy estimator that is adversarially monotonic, by (1) of Definition 4,
there exists a pq such that
f ∗,?(D, p, q, k) ≥ f ∗,?(D, p, q, 0).
A return that maximizes f ∗,?(D,wy, gy, k) implies that
max
g∗∈[0,1]
f ∗,?(D, p, g∗, k) ≥f ∗,?(D, p, q, k).
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fCH, IS and fCH, WIS are non-decreasing w.r.t. the return. Therefore,
arg max
g∗∈[0,1]
f ∗,?(D, p, g∗, k) = max
g∗∈[0,1]
g∗.
Setting g∗ = 1, an importance weight that maximizes f ∗,?(D,wy, 1, k) implies that
max
i∗∈I
f ∗,?(D, i∗, 1, k) ≥f ∗,?(D, p, 1, k).
fCH, IS and fCH, WIS are also non-decreasing w.r.t. the importance weight. So,
arg max
i∗∈I
f ∗,?(D, i∗, 1, k) = max
i∗∈I
i∗.
Since the IS weight is a product of ratios over the length of a trajectory, the ratio at a







πe(At = a, St = s)



















To create H∗, if the ratio at a single time step is greater than 1, a′ and s′ is repeated
for the maximum length of the trajectory, τ ; otherwise, a′ and s′ is repeated only for
a single time step. Thus, H∗ represents the trajectory with the largest return and
importance weight.
Next, we show how Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.2), that define quasi-α-security and α-
security, respectively, apply to L∗,?. Specifically, we show that a safety test using L∗,?
as a metric is a valid safety test that first predicts the performance of πe using D, and
then bounds the predicted performance with high probability. If L∗,?(πe, D) > J(πb),
the safety test returns True; otherwise it returns False.
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Proof. For x ∈ N+, let P : Π × Dπbn → Rx denote any function to predict the
performance of some πe ∈ Π, using data D collected from πb. Also, let B : Rx× [0, 1]→
R denote any function that bounds performance with high probability, 1− δ, where




























































Proof. For x ∈ N+, let P : Π × Dπbn → Rx denote any function to predict the
performance of some πe ∈ Π, using data D collected from πb. Also, let B : Rx× [0, 1]→
R denote any function that bounds performance with high probability, 1− δ, where





























In Lemma 5, we describe a condition that must hold in order to compute a valid
α. The condition states that a valid α must be equal to or greater than the largest
increase in the 1− δ confidence lower bound on J(πe) across all datasets D ∈ Dπbn and
all attack strategies (i.e., the optimal attack).










≤ L∗,?(πe, D) + α, then





A safety test checks whether L∗,?(πe, D) > J(πb). When Eq. (3.11) holds ∀D ∈ Dπbn
and ∀m ∈M,




− α > J(πb)), (3.12)





> J(πb) + α) ≤ Pr(L∗,?(πe, D) > J(πb)),
which, by Lemma (3), implies that a safety test using L∗,? is quasi-α-secure. In the
case of α-security, by Assumption 3, we require a “safe” safety test. That is,
Pr(L∗,?(πe, D) > J(πb)) < δ. (3.13)






− α > J(πb)) < δ,
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> J(πb) + α) < δ,
which, by Lemma (4), implies that a safety test using L∗,? is α-secure.
3.8.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Equation (3.6) for the estimator that uses CH and IS is the following.
α′ = max
D∈DHn













































Recall that b represents the upper bound of all IS weighted returns. Let b = i∗, and


























Equation (3.6) for the estimator that uses CH and WIS is the following.
α′ = max
D∈DHn
















































Let gi = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Also, notice that b = 1 because importance weighted



























3.8.3 Panacea: An Algorithm for Safe and Secure Policy Improvement























Algorithm 2: Panacea(D, πe, α, k)
1: Compute c, using α and k, given estimator
2: for H ∈ D do
3: if IS weight computed using H is greater than c then
4: Set IS weight to c
5: end if
6: end for
7: return clipped D
Algorithm 2. This algorithm ensures a user-specified level of α-security when input
k is selected such that it represents the correct number of trajectories added by an
adversary.
3.8.3.1 Proof of Corollary 1
Let α′ and k′ denote the user-specified inputs to Panacea. Based on Table 3.1,











if k′ = k. Recall that b is the upper bound on all
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IS weighted returns. Due to clipping, b = cCH, IS, and let gi = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The result of Eq. (3.7) for the estimator that uses CH and IS is the following:
max
D∈DHn































































































For WIS, recall that no matter how the clipping weight is set, b ≤ 1 because
importance weighted returns are in range [0, 1], and β 6= 0. So, let wi = 0 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and wn = imin. Also, let gi = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Based on


















































































































































3.8.3.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Let α and k′ denote the user-specified inputs to Panacea. If k′ = k, i.e., the user
inputs the correct number of trajectories added by the attacker, the result of Eq. (3.7)
for the estimator that uses CH and IS is the following.
α = max
D∈DHn



































































































































In this dissertation, we provided two instances demonstrating the importance of
and need for randomness in computer science. It is due to the random nature of
probabilistic data structures and the data generation process that we are able to
utilize concentration inequalities, which are powerful tools. The application of these
tools help conserve bandwidth while ensuring a desired decode rate in Chapter 2, and
guarantee safety in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 2, we introduced a novel solution to the problem of determining a subset
of items from a larger set two parties hold in common, using a novel combination
of two probabilistic data structures, Bloom filters and IBLTs. We also provided a
solution to the more general case, where one party is missing some or all of the items.
Specifically, we described how to parameterize the probabilistic data structures, using
the Chernoff bound, in order to meet a desired decode rate. Through a detailed
evaluation using simulations and real-world deployment, we compared our method to
existing systems, showing that it requires less data transmission over a network and is
more resilient to attack than previous approaches.
In Chapter 3, we analyzed a couple of safety tests that use the Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound. More specifically, we presented a new measure, called α-security, to quantify
the susceptibility of these safety tests to data corruption attacks, which represent
the insertion of non-random samples to a dataset. The effects of such attacks can
be dire, breaking the safety guarantee provided by these methods, and consequently,
highlighting the importance of collecting data randomly. Recognizing that anomalies
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and disturbances can hinder this collection, we also introduced a new algorithm,
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